Resolution or Recess?
An Empirical Analysis of the Causes of Recurring Civil War

A thesis

Submitted in fulfilment

of the requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in Political Science

in the

University of Canterbury

by

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2007

Table of Contents

Chapter Four: Analysis of Single Variables

Chapter Five: Multi-Variant Analysis and Discussion

Chapter Six: Application of Findings and Policy Implications

Appendices

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my parents for their support and encouragement throughout my studies, particularly my Dad for proof reading large sections of this thesis along with nearly every other essay I have ever written. Thank you also to my supervisors Professor Jacob Bercovitch, for stimulating my interest in the field of conflict management and providing the necessary guidance to produce a meaningful piece of research, and Dr. Scott Walker, for his assistance in the more practical tasks of this research. In the laborious task of proof reading and editing, I owe a lot to my sister Zoë Genet who proof-read this entire thesis (some of it twice) and Kass Gibson whose often amusing comments were a great help. I am also indebted to the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust and the Department of Political Science and Communication for providing the funding which made this task possible. Finally, Beth, my office-mates, and other friends, cheers for the support and for helping to keep me going.

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

Abstract

One of the most concerning trends associated with the ongoing problem of civil wars is that conflicts often flare-up a short period after they appeared to have ended. While significant progress has been made in the study of post-civil war peace building and the causes of civil wars, the tendency for civil wars to recur is one factor which has been largely overlooked. This thesis addresses this shortcoming by analysing the causes of recurring civil war using statistical methods. Relevant civil war research was consulted and hypotheses pertaining to the variables which might influence civil war recurrence were formulated. These factors are organised in a contingency framework which suggests that conflict recurrence is dependent on both pre- and post-conflict environments as well as factors associated with how the original conflict was fought. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Centre for the Study of Civil War Armed Conflict Dataset was used to produce a dataset of 238 civil wars which were fought between 1946 and 2004. Additional data pertaining to specific hypotheses was collected from a range of other sources. Statistical analysis was conducted to determine the strength and direction of relationships between different variables and civil war recurrence. Several factors were found to have a significant relationship with civil war recurrence: ethnic diversity, conflicts which were fought over territorial issues and conflicts which were not ended by military victory, particularly those which ended as a result of low or no fatalities. These findings are discussed with reference to improving civil war management and policy recommendations are presented.

Introduction

Civil Wars and Recurrence

"What's so civil about war anyway?"

Axle Rose 1990

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the major security concern facing the world's population has been civil war. During this time there have been hundreds of civil wars involving countries from all corners of the globe. Despite the overwhelming media attention focused on international terrorism, the costs of civil wars far outweigh those of even the most serious and widely publicised terrorist attacks. Civil wars have not only generated a frightening loss of life, both civilian and military, but also untold suffering and misery which result directly from the decline in living standards which are caused by most civil wars. As if the horrors associated with civil war were not bad enough, perhaps one of the most concerning features of civil wars is that their occurrence appears to increase a country's susceptibility to additional civil conflict in the future. This creates what has been referred to as a "conflict trap", where countries become trapped in a vicious cycle of recurring conflict (Collier et al. 2003). Despite this phenomenon, far more conflicts *do not* recur compared with those that do. This thesis will focus specifically on addressing the question of why some civil conflicts recur while others do not. The rationale behind this research is that once the factors which cause conflicts to recur are better understood, we will be better positioned to address the problem and prepare

strategies aimed at preventing conflicts from recurring. The research aims to isolate different variables correlated with civil war recurrence and use this information to develop practical responses to the barriers to permanent civil war settlement.

This introductory chapter begins by broadly outlining the problems of civil war and the difficulties associated with attempting to resolve such conflict. It will then consider more specifically the problem of recurring civil war and discuss some of the most important literature related to the problem. Following this, the objectives of this research will be explained in greater detail with reference to the existing literature in the field. The remaining sections of the chapter will briefly outline the theoretical and methodological approach to this research; the data and other sources of information which will be utilised; the definitions of important concepts and the research limitations. The chapter concludes with an outline of the overall structure of the thesis.

The Problem: The Recurrence of Destructive Civil Wars

Since the end of the Second World War, over ten million people have died as a direct result of armed conflict. Of these fatalities just under eight million were caused by civil war; the remainder were a result of interstate conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). In the 50 years leading up to the Second World War approximately 27 million fatalities were generated in inter-state conflicts, while around 3.3 million fatalities were caused by civil war (Sarkees 2000). While these figures are generated from different datasets, they show a clear trend which is illustrated in Figure 1.1; inter-state conflict is becoming increasingly rare while civil conflicts are becoming the dominant form of violent conflict. Despite the ever-quoted suggestion that the end of the Cold War signalled the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992), conflict has continued to rage with well over 100 conflicts being recorded since 1989 (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

Figure 1.1: The Number of Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946-2004



Source: Harbom and Wallensteen (2005, p 625).

Unfortunately, when considering the costs of civil war, the basic figures only tell a small part of the story. While considerably more difficult to calculate, the true cost of civil war is frighteningly high. To gain a better appreciation of the costs of civil war, Collier et al (2003) divide the costs of civil wars into three spheres; internal, regional and international.

Internal Costs

The internal sphere of civil war costs represents the mortality, displacement and poverty inflicted on the non-combatants within the country. The eight million fatalities generated by civil war since 1945 is an alarmingly high figure; however, it only accounts for the soldiers and civilians killed in actual combat (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 148). It does not account for the changes in social conditions caused by civil war such as famine, the spread of

infectious disease, physical and emotional exhaustion, destruction of infrastructure, economic losses, and increased military expenditure.

The costs associated with civil wars do not end when the fighting stops. Economic costs such as high military expenditure, infrastructure repair and a lack of foreign investment will persist for many years after the conclusion of a civil war. Mortality and disability rates also remain high in the years following conflict. Furthermore, the health and economic costs of civil war are generally not compensated for by any post-conflict improvements in relevant policy areas and political freedom, in reality, both will generally deteriorate. Hence, the typical civil war will trigger a prolonged period of "development in reverse" (Collier et al. 2003, p 2).

Regional and International Costs

The second sphere of costs represents the spill-over effects of the conflict into neighbouring countries. The most obvious of these occurs when fleeing refugees cross into adjacent countries, often carrying infectious diseases such as malaria. Civil war also produces regional instability making surrounding countries less appealing in terms of foreign investment and tourism. Civil wars can also heighten the security concerns of neighbouring states resulting in the escalation of regional arms races.

The third sphere of civil war costs represents the international ramifications of civil war. Civil wars create territories which are outside the control of any recognised government. This territory is not just the battleground for a civil war; it often becomes a safe haven for terrorist organisations and a breeding ground for the production and trafficking of drugs. Another global cost associated with civil war is the spread of AIDS caused by mass rape during warfare (Collier et al. 2003, p 2-3).

Although there is some disagreement concerning the trends in the costs incurred by civil wars[1] it is clear that civil war remains a dominant feature of the current international

[1] Sarkees et al (2003) argue that the fatalities generated by civil war have remained relatively constant over the past 100 years while others, including Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), argue that fatalities generated by civil conflict have been in a state of decline since the end of the Second World War.

system. While often cited as the dominant security paradigm for the 21st century, terrorist attacks claimed just 4,805 lives in the first four years of the 21st century (Frey, Luechinger & Stutzer 2004); less than two per cent of the 268,800 lives claimed by civil war during the same time period (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005). Furthermore, addressing civil war also means addressing one of the root causes of international terrorism. As mentioned earlier, states are most vulnerable to falling into chaos immediately before, during or after conflict. When this happens, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organised crime can flourish (Krasner & Pascal 2005, p 153). It is not surprising that of the seven states suspected by George W. Bush in 2002 of housing terrorists, six have experienced civil war in relatively recent times: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, Iran and the Philippines (the other country being North Korea) (Bush 2002). Furthermore, 95% of the world's hard drug production takes place in countries with a recent history of civil war (Collier et al. 2003, p 2).

While there is some suggestion that the number of civil wars is reducing, the problem is by no means extinct. In early 2005 there were 30 active civil conflicts being fought in 17 different countries around the world, 19 of which have already generated over 1,000 fatalities in their duration (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005, p 623; Marshall & Gurr 2005, p 79-83). Add to this a further 24 countries which were identified by Marshall and Gurr (2005) as being highly susceptible to an outbreak of conflict and over a quarter of the 161 countries with a population greater than half a million are either engaged in or highly susceptible to civil war. Hence, in the post-Cold War world, and the post-9/11 world, the major security concern facing the world's population remains that of civil war.

Civil War Resolution

Civil wars have not only proven more common than inter-state wars but they have also proven to be considerably more difficult to resolve. Between 1940 and 1990, 55% of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20% of civil wars reached similar solutions (Walter 1997, p 335). Instead, most internal conflicts have ended by way of

extermination, capitulation, expulsion of the losing side or mutual exhaustion of the relevant parties. The difficulty in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution in civil war has contributed to a high level of civil war recurrence with 36% of civil conflicts since 1946 being followed by additional conflict (Walter 2004, p 371). The resolution of civil wars provides one particular challenge distinct from inter-state conflicts; participants cannot simply retreat to their respective territories. Opposing factions must disband their forces and relinquish their only means of protection (Walter 1997, p 338). Combatants who have been "killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success," in some cases for a number of years, must learn to live together peacefully in the same territory (Licklider 1995, p 681). Herein lies one of the crucial problems of civil war and one of the major factors contributing to civil war recurrence.

Recurring Civil War

While civil wars are extremely costly and destructive, a second or third conflict breaking out while a country is still recovering from an initial conflict is a particularly daunting prospect. Using the very rudimentary measure of human fatalities, conflicts which recur are generally less severe than their predecessors (Gleditsch et al. 2002). However, given that countries which have recently experienced civil war will generally be in a state of disrepair as a result of the initial conflict, even a very minor subsequent conflict would be likely to have severe ramifications which extend well beyond basic fatality statistics. While avoiding civil wars as a whole is an extremely important objective, it is also important to ensure that existing civil wars and potential future conflicts do not recur. The fact that 36% of conflicts are followed by subsequent conflict means that 64% of conflicts do not recur. This raises a very important question; why do some conflicts recur while others do not? Before considering this question, it is first necessary to consider the progress which has already been made in relevant fields of civil war research.

Review of Current Perspectives on Civil War Management

A large quantity of recent research into the causes of civil war has identified specific factors which make the outbreak of civil war more likely. A high probability of civil war has often been associated with factors such as a low level of economic development, sizeable ethnic diasporas capable of providing funding to rebel groups, thinly dispersed population, political instability, and a lack of state strength (Human Security Centre 2003). It is also frequently suggested that a history of conflict and recent involvement in a previous civil war not only increases the risk of civil war, but also augments other risk factors (Collier et al. 2003; Hegre 2003). While there is a reasonable level of agreement regarding the relationship between these factors and the emergence of civil war, the academic findings regarding the role of democracy and democratisation, the importance of natural resources, and the role of inequality and ethnicity are much more controversial (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6).

As well as considering the causes of civil war, a considerable volume of literature has emerged which considers the circumstances in which peace settlements succeed and fail (Bekoe 2003; Bercovitch 1995; Hartzell 1999; Crocker & Hampson). Much of the literature which considers the stability of post-conflict environments focuses on the conditions prevalent in the post-conflict zone, particularly the nature of peace building efforts and peace agreements. These studies are relevant to this research as they enable comparison to be made between the factors associated with the failure of peace agreements and the factors associated with civil war recurrence.

In spite of the progress which has been made in research on the stability of peace agreements and the factors that make countries susceptible to civil war, very little has been published specifically pertaining to the issue of recurring civil war. The major exception is Barbara Walter's (2004) seminal study *Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War*. Walter's article considers similar objectives to those which are considered in this research, the primary one being why some countries experience renewed civil war while others do not. Walter's findings support her hypothesis that living conditions that favor individual

enlistment in rebel armies – namely low quality of life and barriers to political participation – help to predict which countries will continue to experience civil war and those which will not. The likelihood of returning to war is seen as both a function of the basic well-being of the country's population and the accessibility of government decision-making to the average citizen (Walter 2004, p 385).

Primary Objective

The major focus of this research is to determine why some conflicts recur while others do not. My research aims to expand upon Walter's (2004) research by making three major methodological changes. First, Walter's research is based on the Correlates of War dataset which only includes conflicts which generated at least 1,000 fatalities (Singer & Small 1963). Conversely, my research will be based around the Peace Research Institute of Oslo and Centre for the Study of Civil War (PRIO/CSCW) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). While similar in many respects to the Correlates of War dataset, the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset uses a considerably lower fatality threshold when defining civil war, and as a result includes a far greater number of cases. Using a dataset with a larger sample size not only means that more cases will be included in the study but will also increase the extent to which results can be generalised. Secondly, Walter's research focuses on the post-conflict environment and living conditions and whether or not these conditions will provide the necessary motivation for individuals to reinitiate hostilities. This research will employ a broader approach which considers relevant variables prior to the outbreak of conflict, variables relating to the nature of the conflict and variables associated with the post-conflict environment. Finally, Walter's research considers why countries are susceptible to recurring conflict of any sort, regardless of the participants or incompatibilities involved in the conflict. The objective of ending the cycle of civil war in general is an extremely important goal. However, where internal conflict is followed by another conflict within ten years, over 60% of the subsequent

conflicts involve the same factions and incompatibilities as the preceding conflict[1]. The sheer number of conflicts where the recurrence is essentially the same as the original conflict makes this issue worthy of independent analysis. While civil war does increase the risk of other conflicts of a different nature breaking out, the primary security objective following a civil war must be to ensure that the same mistakes are not made for a second time. Once a country has overcome the immediate threat of the same conflict recurring, they can then move toward addressing the factors which make the country susceptible to different civil wars in the future. Hence, this study will concentrate on addressing why specific conflicts involving the same participants and the same incompatibility recur.

Once the causes of recurring civil war are isolated, a second goal of this research is to formulate policy advice to address this problem. At the end of 2005, there were 37 ongoing civil wars in 27 locations; these conflicts are shown in Figure 1.2 (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005, p 623). While it is critical that these conflicts be brought to an end as rapidly as possible, it is also important that any termination of hostilities is a permanent one. Along with these active conflicts, there are many other conflicts which have ended in recent years. The information derived from the analysis in this study can be used to prevent the recurrence of these recently ended civil wars as well as helping to bring current and future conflicts to a permanent conclusion.

[1] Calculated using all conflicts included in the PRIO/CSCW dataset between 1945 and 1995 (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

Figure 1.2: Location of Active Civil Wars (as of September 2005)



Source: Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen (2005) ● = Civil War ● = Country experiencing more than one civil war

Additional Objectives

A subsidiary goal is to link this research with the existing literature concerning the causes of civil war and negotiated settlements in civil war. Many of the studies considering the outbreak of civil war and the success of negotiated settlements share methodological similarities with the approach used in this research. Hence it makes sense to investigate the differences between the initial causes of civil war and the causes of recurring civil war. The differences between the academic findings regarding the breakdown of negotiated settlements and the recurrence of civil war can also be considered. As previously mentioned, the findings from this research will also be compared with those of Barbara Walter (2004).

Methodological Approach and Theoretical Framework

Early civil war research has traditionally been undertaken using a detailed, single study or case study approach. In more recent years there has been an upsurge in statistical studies which derive trends and generalisations from a large number of cases (see Collier & Hoeffler 2005; Fearon 2004; Walter 2004). The primary purpose of this research is to establish trends and generalisations regarding the likelihood of civil war recurrence. The findings from a case study approach will only accurately apply to the case in question and will not necessarily provide information which can be applied to other or emerging civil wars. Given the number of different variables which might influence whether or not a conflict recurs, a statistical approach will allow consideration of a large number of variables and will provide the most accurate picture of what factors cause conflicts to recur. Hence, while both statistical and case study methods have their respective advantages and disadvantages, the increased predictive value of a statistical approach makes it the most logical methodology given the objectives of this research.

This research will not test or expand an existing theory but instead aims to establish a new framework showing how different variables at the different stages of conflict relate to civil

war recurrence. From this information, practical ideas regarding durable and lasting conflict resolution will be derived. This framework will be based on Bercovitch's Contingency Model of Conflict Mediation (Bercovitch & Wells 1993). Bercovitch's Contingency Model was originally developed to assess how different factors influence the success of efforts to mediate conflicts. Given the similarity between those objectives and the purpose of this research it is logical to develop a Contingency Model to consider civil war recurrence. Bercovitch's Contingency Model assumes that various antecedent conditions prior to mediation taking place will influence the way in which mediation is conducted. Subsequently, the way in which mediation is conducted will influence the extent to which the mediation was a success[1]. The Contingency Model formulated to consider civil war recurrence follows the same pattern as Bercovitch's Contingency Model considering how factors at the antecedent and current level influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence. In this model, antecedent conditions will refer to conditions relating to how the original conflict was fought, the characteristics of the country in which the civil war was fought and the characteristics of any third party involvement during the conflict. The current conditions refer primarily to the way in which the original conflict ended, the nature of any military victory, and the involvement of third parties in any peace building initiatives. The consequent condition in this framework simply denotes whether there will be a relapse into conflict. Some of the different categories within the framework will be further broken down into more specific variables; this will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Three.

The Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (see Figure 1.3) will initially serve simply to provide a clear visual description of the hypothesised variables which might influence civil war recurrence at both the antecedent and post-conflict levels. Having tested the relationship between the variables in the initial framework (Figure 1.3) and civil war recurrence, those which do not have a substantial influence can be removed providing a clear picture of the variables which are most strongly correlated with civil war recurrence.

[1] See Appendix A for a copy of Bercovitch's Contingency Model of Mediation

Figure 1.3: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence



Data and Sources of Information

A large quantity of statistical research focusing on civil war and other forms of violent conflict has utilised data from The Correlates of War Project. The Correlates of War Project was established by David Singer (1963) and has created many datasets for use in the study of international relations including datasets considering inter-, extra- and intra-state war. The principal goal of the project is "the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war" (Singer & Small 1963). Working with the historian Melvin Small, Singer has established a definition of war which has been used in many subsequent studies. Singer and Small's definition of civil war is composed of four phenomena (a) that military action was involved, (b)

the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides and (d) there were at least 1,000 battle deaths during the conflict. The Correlates of War dataset contains information such as the cause of the dispute, the number of conflict fatalities and how the dispute ended for all conflicts which meet this definition since 1816 (Singer & Small 1963).

Under the directorship of Håvard Hegre, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (PRIO) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) (a division of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) have collaborated in the production of a dataset of armed conflicts, both internal and external, in the period 1946 to present. This dataset contains similar information to the Correlates of War dataset, the major point of difference being that it uses a different definition of conflict. PRIO/CSCW define armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Strand et al. 2005, pp 3-4). Given the considerably lower fatality threshold used in this definition, the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset contains a much greater number of cases. The PRIO/CSCW project has also developed datasets specifically related to conflict fatalities (Hegre 2005). This study will use the same definition of conflict as the PRIO/CSCW project and the PRIO/CSCW datasets will form the primary source of the data used in the research. The sample will consist of all of the conflicts in the PRIO/CSCW dataset which ended prior to 1994[1]. Some of the data required to test the various hypotheses was already included in the PRIO/CSCW dataset, however other hypotheses required data to be collected from a number of other sources including other datasets and my own calculations. The details of where this data was sourced are provided in Chapter Four.

[1] See Appendix B for a full list of the conflicts that are included in the analysis.

Research Limitations

As with any statistical study, the findings in this research are limited to the quality of the information used. Given that there are over 230 cases used in the sample for this analysis it is impossible to consider every case in detail. Instead cases were considered with reference to 22 different variables which were predicted to have some influence on whether or not the conflict would recur. The variables which were tested were subject to the availability of information. In some cases there were variables of interest which may influence civil war recurrence yet these were not included in the analysis due to the availability of relevant data. For example, it was initially planned to include some measure of the intensity of post-conflict peace building efforts at the "current conditions" level of analysis; however, a measure of this variable was not readily available. Given the number of cases involved in this research it was not feasible to carry out detailed research on all the conflicts in the dataset to a level where the nature of post-conflict peace building efforts could be accurately coded, recorded and included in the analysis.

It is also important to remember that this research only considers why conflicts which are essentially the same recur; it does not consider conflicts arising over different issues or with different participants to be recurrences of civil war. It was initially planned to include two definitions of recurrence, one general, which included any civil war occurring within twenty years of a previous conflict ending as well as the more specific definition which has already been outlined where the incompatibilities and personnel involved in the conflict must be the same as in the previous conflict. Bearing in mind the time frame and resources available for this study, it was decided that the use of two definitions was too ambitious. Given that Walter (2004) has already considered the causes of recurring civil war using a general definition it was decided to focus this research specifically on recurrences of conflicts which are essentially the same and then compare the findings with Walter's.

Structure

Chapter Two outlines the findings of existing civil war research and will provide the academic context of this research. It begins with an examination of the various methodological approaches to civil war research focusing on the pros and cons of different approaches. Following this there will be a review of the literature concerning some of the initial causes of civil war. Consideration of the factors which cause civil wars will focus around the "greed and grievance" argument, regime type, ethnic and cultural diversity, duration of conflicts, and the influence of peace building and negotiated settlements. Based on the information gathered from the consulted literature, 22 hypotheses regarding the relationship between different variables and civil war recurrence will be presented.

Chapter Three will consider in detail some definitions of the important terms used in this research, particularly the definition of a civil war and recurring civil war. The Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence will also be expanded to include the specific variables which are considered in the research and the methodological approach used to analyse these variables will be introduced.

Chapter Four will present the findings revealed from the testing of hypotheses. Each hypothesis will be considered in turn covering three major points. First, the variables used to test the hypothesis will be described and the process by which they were collected will be explained. Secondly, the hypotheses will be tested using single variant analysis. This will be undertaken using Spearman's Rank Order Correlations to determine the direction and the strength of the relationship between the independent variables (such as conflict fatalities) and the dependent variable (whether or not the civil war recurs). This analysis considers the influence of the variable that is being tested in isolation and assumes that all other factors are equal. Hence, although this analysis is useful, it only provides an indication of what causes civil war recurrence. Finally, the results of the Rank Order Correlations will be considered with reference to literature upon which the hypotheses were based.

Chapter Five will apply multivariate analysis to the testing of hypotheses. In this analysis, variables are not tested in isolation but are instead considered in clusters where the influence of all variables is taken into consideration. Variables were grouped according to the categories shown in the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence then tested using Binary Logistic Regressions. The most significant results from each cluster were isolated and then tested again as a separate cluster to give the closest possible indication of what variables influence conflict recurrence. The findings from the multivariate analysis are divided into three categories. First, insignificant variables which have no or very little relationship with civil war recurrence. Secondly, intermediary variables which showed a noteworthy but not statistically significant relationship with civil war recurrence. Finally, significant variables, which showed a statistically significant relationship with civil war recurrence when tested using Binary Logistic Regression. All of the insignificant and intermediate variables were removed from the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence leaving only the factors which are most strongly associated with civil war remaining as part of the model. The significant findings from this analysis are then discussed in greater detail with a focus on how the findings compare with previous research and how the findings might influence approaches to post-conflict peace building.

Chapter Six concludes this research by reconsidering the major questions and objectives of this study and by summarising the key findings of the research. Following this, two civil wars which have ended in the past ten years will be considered in an attempt to evaluate their relative risks of recurrence in light of the findings from this research. The findings from this research are also discussed with reference to improving post-conflict peace building and policy recommendations are presented. The study concludes by briefly considering how this research could be improved and discussing the importance of continued civil war research.

Chapter Two

Current Perspectives Regarding Civil War and the Causes of Recurring Civil War

Introduction

Unsurprisingly, given the devastation caused by civil war, a considerable quantity of academic work has been published which focuses on gaining accurate academic knowledge of the phenomenon. Despite the sizeable volume of literature which has emerged regarding civil war, there remain many unanswered questions and areas of debate. The purpose of this research is to address one such area; the problem of recurring civil war, by determining which variables will increase a conflict's susceptibility to recurrence. The central purpose of this chapter is to formulate specific hypotheses which can be tested at the pre- and post-conflict levels of analysis.

While several scholars have considered the problem of civil war recurrence, this research is unique in that it is the first which considers recurring civil war focusing specifically on the recurrence of conflicts which share the same characteristics as the preceding conflict. Hence, hypotheses will be based on existing research in similar fields including the causes of an initial outbreak of civil war, research considering the breakdown of negotiated settlements and peace agreements, and the causes of recurring civil war in general. Relevant ideas regarding conflict recurrence will be presented at the end of the chapter and incorporated into the Contingency Framework of Conflict Recurrence. This approach will enable consideration of the substantial progress which has already been made in the field of civil war research along

with introducing the background information on which the hypotheses tested in this thesis are based.

The chapter will begin by briefly outlining the pros and cons of the two major approaches to civil war research and discuss the rationale for the use of a statistical approach. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the major areas of civil war research; the initial causes of civil war, the duration of civil war, negotiated settlements in civil wars and the problem of recurring civil war. From this literature, a series of hypotheses regarding civil war recurrence will be developed which will form the basis for the subsequent analysis in this study.

Methodological Approaches to Civil War Research

Most civil war research is undertaken using either case studies or statistical methodology. Both approaches have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The strengths of the case study approach can easily be identified; first, case studies enable the researcher to carry out detailed considerations of contextual variables which is often impossible in statistical studies. Secondly, case studies are more likely to reveal new variables which will often generate new hypotheses. Thirdly, case studies allow researchers to make inferences regarding causal mechanisms through the use of process tracing. These causal mechanisms can also be used to provide historical explanations of cases. Finally, the case study approach also allows the inclusion of complex causal relations which could not be accommodated by statistical studies. Case studies however are also prone to a number of problems. They are particularly susceptible to selection bias, can suffer from indeterminacy, and inevitably will lack a representative sample (Bennett 2004, pp 34-39). Conversely, statistical methods are also subject to several limitations, primarily their inability to provide the advantages of the case study approach such as the identification of new variables and the testing of historical explanations. However, statistical methods have the advantage of allowing estimation of the average explanatory effects of variables, the ability to analyse the representativeness or frequency of subsets of the data collected, and a high degree of

replicability when using the same data (Bennett 2004, p 45-46). The goal from this research is to establish general trends regarding civil war recurrence which can be applied to future conflicts. Hence, utilising a statistical approach will be far more beneficial than the case study approach. A more detailed description of the research methodology will be presented in the following chapter.

The Causes of Civil War

Many of the early studies concerned with the causes of civil war, including the likes of Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970), focused on relative deprivation as a cause of conflict. Relative deprivation illustrates the difference between an individual's expectations and the actual performance and accomplishments that they experience. The frustration generated when political expectations are not matched by sufficient performance was thought to contribute to a willingness to rebel. Another early theory behind the causes of civil war is that inequality (a judgement resulting from comparison of an individual with others in society rather than ones own expectations) over either land or income can generate discontent, which when managed poorly by a government would produce rebellion (Muller & Mitchell 1987; Russett 1964). Both of these ideas, however, are based primarily on theoretical reasoning and the empirical evidence supporting them is not strong (Regan & Norton 2003, p 5).

More recent research into the causes of civil war has revealed several more specific ideas relating to the conditions that contribute to the outbreak of civil conflict. A high risk of civil war has often been associated with the following factors: a low level of economic development, ethnic diasporas capable of providing funding to rebel groups, thinly dispersed population, political instability, and state strength (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6). It is also commonly suggested that a high incidence of conflict and recent involvement in a previous civil war not only increases the risk of civil war but also augments other risk factors (Collier & Sambanis 2002, p 7). While there is a reasonable level of agreement regarding the impact of these factors on the emergence of civil war, the academic findings regarding the role of

democracy and democratisation, the importance of natural resources, and the role of inequality and ethnicity are much more controversial (Human Security Centre 2003, p 6) and will now be discussed in greater detail.

Economic Factors, Greed and Grievance and Natural Resources

One of the most dominant lines of argument regarding the causes of civil war is the debate between "greed and grievance". Traditionally, "grievances" such as a lack of political representation, ethnic or religious divisions or economic inequality have been suggested as important factors contributing to the outbreak of civil war. Until relatively recently, the few studies that focused on the economic dimensions of civil war have continued this trend focusing on the presence of economic grievances such as resource scarcity and economic deprivation. More recently, increasing academic attention has focused on the economic aspects of civil war, particularly the relationship between natural resource abundance and conflict and the self-financing nature of civil wars (Auty 2004; Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Berdal & Malone 2000; de Soysa 2002; Ross 2004a).

Collier and Hoeffler (1998) undertook statistical research on civil wars fought since 1965 in an effort to determine which variables place a country at the greatest risk of civil war. The findings of this study did not support the traditional view of civil war being a result of genuine grievances. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) concluded that four factors increased the probability of civil war occurrence: low per capita income, natural resource exports (to a certain extent), large population and ethno-linguistic polarisation. Proxy variables for "grievances" such as ethnic diversity and political under-representation failed to show a noteworthy correlation with the outbreak of civil war. A number of reasons are presented as to why these characteristics provide motivation for rebellion. First, low per capita income increases the likelihood of rebellion success as the government has a lower tax income to spend on the military. Secondly, to a certain extent, the wealth generated by natural resource exports increases the probability of civil war as this provides rebel organisations with an incentive to

capture control of the state. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p 569) describe the relationship between natural resources and civil war as an "inverse U" because at a high level, natural resource exports begin to reduce the probability of civil war as they increase the wealth of the state and hence its ability to defend itself. Thirdly, larger populations will increase the probability of civil war because increasing population size is correlated with an increase in the number of secessionist movements. Finally, polarised societies are at greater risk of civil war because this reduces the difficulties of organising a rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, pp 564-567).

In a more recent study, Collier (2000) places greater emphasis on the viability of a rebellion than the previous motive based explanation. Using a dataset of civil wars between 1960 and 1999 his results again suggest that objective grievances have no direct link to the outbreak of civil war. Instead it was found that where natural resources are accessible, rebel groups will take advantage of large masses of uneducated youths in order to exploit such resources in an effort to increase their wealth. In order to muster support for such causes, rebel leaders will incite grievances so as to ensure group cohesion and organisation (Collier 2000, p 850). Collier and Hoeffler's "Greed and Grievance" thesis has produced considerable media attention and has influenced several noteworthy policy initiatives. For example, a United Nations endorsed initiative consistent with Collier and Hoeffler's argument known as the "Kimberly Process" was commenced in May 2000 in an effort to end the trade in "conflict diamonds"[1] (Fearon 2005, p 484).

Following Collier and Hoeffler's research, many recent studies have considered the relationship between natural resource wealth and civil war. The apparent relationship between natural resources (particularly oil, narcotics, timber, gemstones, gas and agricultural products) and civil conflict has been labelled by many as the "resource curse" (Collier & Hoeffler 2005; Dunning 2005; Pegg 2006; Ross 1999; Lujala et al. 2005). It is suggested that natural resources can promote conflict through several modes. First, the ability for elites to extract rents from

[1] For further information see www.kimberlyprocess.com

natural resources might encourage rebels to use violence in an attempt to capture these rents. Rents from natural resources are commonly viewed as unearned and are particularly easy to embezzle; as a result, natural resource rents are often associated with corruption. This provides would-be rebels with a source of legitimacy when challenging the government. Additionally, states which have developed a dependency on unearned income tend to have fewer institutions that engage their citizens than states which are reliant on income from the taxation of their population. This lack of institutional structure can generate feelings of alienation and protest from citizens. Secondly, the distribution of wealth and employment generated by resource extraction often creates many grievances which could lead to armed conflict. Thirdly, economies that are dependent on natural resources are particularly susceptible to trade shocks and changes in the value of the resources they export. Should either of these phenomena occur, political dissatisfaction and instability often emerge. Finally, natural resources often lead to civil wars having a longer duration than would otherwise be possible if there were no resource rents to sustain the combatants. Furthermore, where conflicts are funded by natural resources, some participants will endeavour to "spoil" peace agreements as they stand to gain more from the continuation of conflict and hence the continued exploitation of resources (Humphreys 2005, pp 26-39).

As a result of the apparently wide-ranging means by which natural resources can promote conflict, a large number of studies have been conducted which empirically analyse the relationship between conflict and natural resources. These studies have produced variable and often contradictory findings. For example, as mentioned earlier, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that there is an "inverse U" relationship between the percentage of a state's GDP which is made up of natural resource exports and the likelihood of civil war occurrence. Contrastingly, using a different dataset, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p 87) concluded that the share of primary commodity exports in GDP has no significant correlation with civil war. In a more recent study, using the same civil war codings and the same model specifications but using different systems

of analysis, Fearon (2005, p 503) concluded that the "correlation between primary commodity exports and civil war outbreak is neither strong nor robust".

In an effort to clarify the findings regarding natural resource exports and civil war occurrence, Ross (2004b, p 338) considered the results of fourteen different studies that address the natural resource-civil war relationship. Four common conclusions which hold true in most cross-national studies of civil war were established. First, the presence of oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; secondly, 'lootable' commodities like gemstones and drugs tend to lengthen existing conflicts; thirdly, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities – a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods – and the onset of civil war is not robust. Ross (2004b, p 338) also revealed an equally large number of questions regarding natural resources and civil war which remain the centre of debate:

> "whether or not natural resources influence the onset of conflict; whether or not resources influence the duration of conflict; whether resources influence all types of civil wars or only a subtype, e.g. ethnic or separatist conflicts; whether all types of resources, or only a subset (e.g. oil, diamonds) are linked to conflict; and what causal mechanisms link resources to conflict".

Regime Type

The relationship between regime type and civil war is another important theme in the study of civil war. Debate in this area has focused around two factors: the nature of the political system (democracy versus autocracy), and the degree of stability in the political system. An initial consideration of the relationship between regime type and civil war occurrence would most likely generate the conclusion that democratic countries are less likely to experience conflict than countries with non-democratic political systems. The very nature of democratic government appears to be conducive to non-violent means of conflict resolution:

> "Democratic political systems are supposed to allow all parties to a conflict to be heard, decisions are made on the basis of rules all parties to the conflict agree to, open debates and a free press ensures that the decision-making is transparent, and the losing party in contentious issues is willing to comply with the outcome because the democratic constitution guarantees that the party may prevail in the future" (Hegre 2003, p 1).

In one of the more comprehensive studies of this relationship, Hegre et al (2001) ranked states on a scale ranging from highly democratic to highly autocratic. It was found that states in the middle range of this scale were most susceptible to civil war while states with consolidated democracies or autocracies had a significantly lower risk of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001, p 42). Semi-democratic or semi-autocratic regimes promulgate enough repression to produce grievances and protest yet are also open enough to allow disaffected parties to organise and rally against the government. Conversely, highly autocratic governments are so repressive that opposition groups struggle to gain momentum and for the reasons listed above, civil war in highly democratic societies is also unlikely (Hegre et al. 2001, p 33). In similar studies considering the relationship between democracy and civil war occurrence, other scholars including Fearon and Laitin (2003), Muller and Weede (1990), Ellingsen (2000), and Reynal-Querol (2002) have found evidence of this inverted U-curve relationship where civil war is most likely to occur in countries with a mid-spectrum regime type.

Regime stability has also proven to be an influential factor in determining the risk of civil war outbreak. Political change in either direction (toward democracy or autocracy) creates conditions ripe for rebellion (Hegre et al. 2001, p 34). When authoritarian regimes collapse, states usually lack the institutional resources to establish a new political system with the level of accommodation typical of established democracies, hence generating the potential for ethnic or ideological conflict (Gurr 1970, p 165). If the change is toward increased authoritarianism the erosion of political institutions will generate increased repression which, when coupled

with weak institutions, is a key catalyst for violence (Zanger 2000, pp 226-227). Empirical testing has shown that changes in the nature of a regime clearly increase the risk of civil conflict in the short term (Hegre et al. 2001, p 42).

Ethnic and Religious Diversity

It is often suggested that the proliferation of civil conflicts, particularly those since the end of the Cold War, are a result of ethnic and religious antagonisms (Fearon & Laitin 2003, p 75). There are a number of theories which account for the prevalence of ethnic conflict. Some suggest that ethnicity is an exceptionally strong affiliation which as a result "charges interethnic interactions with the potential for violence" (Sambanis 2001, p 263). In other cases it is suggested that ancient group hatreds based on memories of past atrocities make ethnic conflict difficult to avoid. Similarly, the clash of cultures theory suggests that irreconcilable differences create fear and insecurity which leads to violence. Despite the quantity of theoretical ideas providing rationale for ethnic conflict, empirical research has not uncovered clear evidence of a correlation between ethnic cleavages or inequalities and conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003, p 75) considered the prevalence of civil war since the end of the Second World War using a dataset of 127 conflicts and concluded that when per capita income was held constant "it appears *not* to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity – or indeed any particular cultural demography – by itself makes a country more prone to civil war". The major factor contributing to the outbreak of civil war in this research was per capita income, with a reduction of $1,000 in per capita income equating to a 41% increase in the likelihood of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003, pp 82-83). Fearon and Laitin's (2003) findings are generally consistent with other studies of a similar nature[1], including Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2001).

[1] The exception being that other studies (Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002) have found that ethnic polarization *is* correlated with the outbreak of civil war, this trend was not present in Fearon and Laitin's (2003, p 75) analysis.

Rather than actual ethnic differences or inequalities, Fearon and Laitin (2003) concluded that the opportunity and ability to wage an insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare were more relevant factors in determining the likelihood of civil war occurrence. Factors which increase the feasibility of guerrilla warfare such as mountainous terrain, high population, a large number of young males and potential support from neighbouring states were all found to increase the risk of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003, pp 85-86). These findings were similar to those of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who also found that factors which provide an opportunity to wage a rebellion such as substantial natural resource exports, a thinly dispersed population and low per capita income (making the recruitment of rebels less expensive) is much more likely to generate a civil war than traditional grievances associated with the outbreak of civil war such as inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious diversity.

The findings of both Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) support the theory that conflicts often appear to be based on ethnicity as a result of entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests by taking advantage of existing ethnic networks. Elites will sometimes manipulate ethnic identities to reinforce societal cleavages in such a way as to produce sources of friction and conflict which will provide a more legitimate façade to disguise the less virtuous motivations behind the conflict (Sambanis 2001, p 263).

Civil war research which has considered the role of psychological factors as causes of civil war also discounts ethnicity as a primary cause of civil war and instead suggests that motivations such as personal vengeance and the opportunity to settle old scores are often root causes of civil conflicts. Citing many examples from various civil wars, Kalyvas (2000, pp 12-14) argues that personal conflicts or family feuds are often misinterpreted as a reflection of other cleavages in the conflict.

Geography and Conflict

The aforementioned studies which focus on ethnicity as a potential cause of civil war have all revealed that to some extent geographic factors will influence the risk of civil war.

High population, mountainous terrain, thinly dispersed population and a potential sanctuary for rebels in neighbouring states all increase the risk of a state being exposed to civil war. The importance of geography in interstate war has long been recognised with significant early contributions coming from theorists including Mahan (1918), Spykman (1944), Mackinder (1919), and Haushofer (1942). However, the literature which investigates the impact of geographic variables on civil war is relatively sparse. In one of the few articles which specifically considers the influence of geographic factors on civil war, Buhaug and Gates (2002) reveal several interesting trends. First, rebels with the goal of seceding from the state tend to fight further away from the capital than groups attempting to seize control of the state (Buhaug & Gates 2002, p 428). Secondly, rebel groups with an ethnic or religious identity will also tend to fight further away from the capital than other groups. Thirdly, civil war zones which are adjacent to an international border will be larger than conflicts whose battle zone is not bordered by another state. Interestingly, Buhaug and Gates' hypothesis that mountainous or forested terrain would produce larger conflict zones was not supported (Buhaug & Gates 2002, pp 429-430).

Duration of Conflicts

Along with the causes of civil war, considerable attention has focused on the duration of civil wars and why some conflicts last longer than others (DeRouen & Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004b; Filson & Werner 2002; Regan 2002). On average, a civil war will last around seven years (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004, p 253) while an interstate war will have a duration of approximately 11 months (Bennett & Stam 1996, pp 254-255). Obviously, the greater the duration of a conflict the greater its destructive potential meaning that reducing the duration of conflicts is an important issue for policy makers. A number of studies have considered both theoretically and empirically what factors influence the duration of a civil war.

Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) consider the factors which influence the duration of civil wars using a dataset of 77 large-scale conflicts. Three characteristics were

shown to lengthen conflict: low per capita income, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic division (two or three major ethnic groups). Two key factors which shortened the duration of conflicts are a decline in the prices of the primary commodities that the country exports and an external military intervention on the side of the rebels (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004, p 268). Interestingly, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004, p 266) did not find any significant correlation between forested or mountainous terrain and the duration of civil wars. Historically, it was found that conflicts in the 1980's and 1990's were likely to be of a longer duration than earlier conflicts, possibly as a result of rebels obtaining easier access to international markets where they can sell goods and purchase military equipment (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom et al. 2004, p 268).

In a similar study using a dataset of 128 civil wars between 1946 and 2000, Fearon (2004b) revealed some interesting trends regarding the duration of civil wars. Conflicts involving rurally based guerrilla bands operating in close proximity to international borders have been particularly difficult to end, especially when these conflicts involve what Fearon (2004b, p 277) refers to as "sons of the soil dynamics" where land or natural resource disputes arise between a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group. Furthermore, conflicts in which rebel groups have access to funds from contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca also tend to have a longer duration. Conversely, anti-colonial wars and civil wars arising out of coup attempts and popular revolutions are usually quite brief (Fearon, 2004b, p 277).

Peace Building, Negotiated Settlements and Civil War Recurrence

Many of the studies which have considered the causes of civil war have suggested that previous involvement in civil war or other forms of violent conflict will greatly increase a country's vulnerability to further conflict. Historically, 36% of civil conflicts since 1946 have been followed by additional conflict (Walter 2004, p 371). Bearing this relatively strong correlation in mind, there is surprisingly little in the way of literature which specifically

considers why some wars recur while others do not. Much of the literature which considers the stability of post-conflict environments focuses on the conditions prevalent in the post-conflict zone, particularly the nature of peace building efforts and peace treaties.

Peace building activities can be divided into four categories, first, monitoring or observer missions which have the purpose of monitoring a truce or peace agreement though the presence of observers. Secondly, traditional peacekeeping, which involves the deployment of military and civilian personnel as consented to by all the parties in an effort to facilitate the settlement of a conflict. Thirdly, multidimensional peacekeeping which is designed to implement a full negotiated peace agreement and introduce a number of strategies to promote self-sustaining peace. A final form of peace building is peace enforcement which usually involves a multilateral military intervention designed to impose public order by force, with or without the consent of the host government (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 781). The success of such peace building initiatives has been described as "mixed at best: occasional successes in restoring a legitimate and effective government are matched by striking failures to do so" (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 779).

Zartman (1995b, pp 269-273) argues that reconciliation is dependent on four key factors. First, power structures need to be organised effectively. In order to accomplish this, some form of temporary agent is needed at the top to provide a structure within which institutions can gradually emerge. In conjunction with this, both powerful rebels and more legitimate civic leaders need to be brought together so that they both have a stake in the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Secondly, it is important to increase state legitimacy through constructive participation and support from society. Thirdly, the state's ability to extract and reallocate resources must be restored. Without the generation of resources the state will be unable to begin reconstruction and overcome problems of neglect and misallocation which lie at the root of many conflicts. In order to ensure that all three areas, power, participation and resources, are successfully maintained during a post-conflict period, external assistance is "advantageous if not necessary" (Zartman, 1995b, p 272).

Having recognised the importance of external involvement in peace building initiatives, Sambanis and Doyle (2000) have considered what types of interventions are most likely to produce lasting peace agreements. They argue that three factors will influence the durability of a post-conflict settlement; the economic and social capabilities of the state, the availability and extent of external assistance, and the level of residual hostility from the conflict. Centred on these factors, Sambanis and Doyle (2000) test the influence of a number of proxy variables on the success of peace building initiatives. The findings of this research are particularly relevant to the causes of recurring civil war as it is likely that factors which contribute to the collapse of peace processes will be similar to those which cause periods of peace to subside back into conflict. Five proxy variables were used to measure war related hostility: the number of fatalities and displaced persons resulting from the conflict, the type of conflict, the number of factions involved in the conflict, the level of ethnic division, and the outcome of the conflict. Several important ideas regarding the resolution of civil wars were revealed. With regard to the quantity of deaths and displacement, it was found that peace building initiatives were less successful in conflicts of a high intensity. It was thought that higher fatalities and suffering caused by the conflict would increase feelings of resentment and the desire for revenge, hence making the conflict more difficult to resolve. Identity wars were significantly negatively correlated with peace building success (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, pp 787-789). Identity wars, especially ethnic conflicts, are particularly intractable because ethnic identity is a very powerful association, depending on "language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change" (Kaufmann 1996, p 138). Higher numbers of factions were also found to have a significant negative correlation with peace building success. It is suggested that this is a result of an increased number of potentially divergent positions which makes it particularly difficult to produce a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785). This finding concurs with similar lines of reasoning hypothesised by scholars considering the international system such as Deutsch and Singer (1964), Waltz (1964) and Selten (1973) (cited in Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785).

The one key factor which was found to be beneficial to peace building was an outcome where the conflict ended in the signing of a treaty (as opposed to military victory or informal truce). It was suggested that this showed that participants in the conflict at least had some motivation to move toward resolution (Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785). Conflicts of a longer duration were also found to be correlated with successful peace building, probably as a result of exhaustion which generated a genuine desire to resolve the conflict. This finding, however, was not as statistically robust as others mentioned.

In a similar study, Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) also consider the factors that determine a successful civil war settlement. They suggest that the factors which influence civil war settlement can be divided into two broad categories: the settlement environment and the features of the settlement agreement. The settlement environment refers to factors such as the characteristics of the country in which the civil war takes place, the international environment, and the nature of the actual civil war itself. The features of the settlement agreement include factors such as the stability of post-war institutions and the types of protections offered to various groups (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, p 187). Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) use a dataset of 41 civil conflicts which were ended by some form of negotiated settlement between 1945 and 1998 to test how different variables within these categories influence the likelihood of a negotiated civil war settlement breaking down within five years of the negotiations taking place. The success of a settlement was measured by the number of months of peace which followed the signing of the settlement.

The influence of three variables which relate specifically to the nature of the civil war were tested: the duration of the conflict, the intensity of the conflict (measured by the mean number of fatalities per month), and the nature of the issues at stake in the civil war. It is often suggested that conflicts over identity issues are particularly difficult to resolve as the stakes are higher and non-divisible. For these reasons Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001, p 189) hypothesised that negotiated settlements would be less likely to fail in politico-economic conflicts than in identity-based conflicts. In contradiction to Sambanis and Doyle's (2000)

findings, the issue at stake in the conflict was not found to have a significant influence on the success of peace settlements. This is probably because the security concerns following a civil war would be the same regardless of the causes of that conflict (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, p 199). It was also suggested peace agreements would be less successful in conflicts of a high intensity due to the increased feelings of insecurity which accompany high losses of life. This hypothesis was supported; a strong positive correlation between conflict intensity and settlement failure was found. The final variable associated with the nature of the conflict is the duration of the conflict. In contrast to the intensity of the conflict, it was suggested that settlements of longer conflicts were more likely to be stable as longer conflicts allow the disputants sufficient time to assess their relative strength. As the duration of a conflict lengthens parties are more likely to believe that they are unable to prevail in the conflict and hence settlement becomes an increasingly desirable outcome. This hypothesis was also supported (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, pp 188-199).

Two factors associated with the nature of the settlement agreement were found to increase the likelihood of settlement success: agreements which provided some form of territorial autonomy between the competing factions and settlements which included provisions for third party enforcement. Regarding the nature of the state in which the settlement is made, it was found that peace settlements are more likely to succeed in countries with a history of democratic government. Surprisingly, it was revealed that the variable associated with the international environment had little impact on success of peace settlements; post-Cold War settlements were no more successful than others (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001).

In one of the few articles which specifically considers recurring civil war, Walter (2004) argues that rather than factors associated with the previous war or the nature of the settlement, the most important factors in civil war recurrence are those related to rebel recruitment:

> "Rebel leaders do not have the luxury to call on a standing army or forcibly conscript citizens should grievances or opportunities for rebellions arise. Instead, they must recruit and remobilise soldiers for

> each individual campaign. This places the onus for renewed war on ordinary people and the trade-offs they must make for returning to war or staying at peace, and their decision to enlist or not enlist is likely to be based on very personal cost calculations. The attributes of a previous war may matter, but civilians are not going to transform themselves from shopkeepers back into soldiers unless the conditions that exist *at any given point in time* encourage this transformation" (Walter 2004, p 374).

Walter (2004) suggests that the conditions most likely to encourage citizens to commit to rebellion are extreme individual hardship which is considered to be worse than the risk of death in combat and the perception that violence is the only means by which citizens can improve their individual position. Using data collected from the Correlates of War dataset, Walter (2004) compared the prevalence of factors associated with the previous conflict and factors relating to the post-conflict living conditions to determine which had the most influence on civil war recurrence. Two important findings were revealed. First, recurrence of a civil war is influenced by the characteristics of the previous civil war. Longer wars were significantly less likely to recur and conflicts which were ended in the partition of a country were significantly *more* likely to recur (Walter 2004, p 379). Like Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), Walter (2004, p 379) suggests that longer conflicts will recur less frequently "because resources and support have been depleted or because better information on relative capabilities and resolve is available to potential combatants". Conflicts which end in partition are more likely to recur as government concession of territory promotes additional challengers to pursue their own demands[1] (Walter 2004, p 374).

Factors of note which Walter found to have no significant influence on civil war recurrence were the intensity of the conflict (measured in either total fatalities or fatalities per

[1] Bearing in mind the fact that Walter (2004) uses a broad definition of recurring civil war where participants and incompatibilities do not have to be the same as in previous conflicts. While partition does reduce the likelihood of further civil war involving the same combatants, it does increase the risk of further civil war in general.

month), whether or not the key issues in the conflict were resolved, whether or not the conflict ended in a decisive victory for one side and whether the conflict was fought over total or non-total goals (Walter 2004, p 380). A second major finding in Walter's research is that post-conflict living conditions do have an impact on civil war recurrence. A number of quality of life indicators such as infant mortality and adult illiteracy are significantly correlated with civil war recurrence. Contrastingly however, level of democracy was not found to significantly influence the likelihood of a civil war recurring (Walter 2004, p 382).

Potential Causes of Recurring Civil War

The preceding pages have discussed the major fields of civil war research. Relative to other aspects of civil wars the problem of recurring civil war has been somewhat neglected. This research will consider recurring civil war focusing on the recurrence of conflicts which have the same characteristics as preceding conflicts. While this is the first time that this specific problem has been addressed, the literature consulted in this chapter has uncovered several theoretical concepts which can be applied to conflict recurrence. These concepts form the basis of the specific elements of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence and the hypotheses which will be analysed.

The hypotheses regarding civil war recurrence fall into several broad categories which will make up the basis for the theoretical framework used in this study: the characteristics of the original conflict, the geographic and ethno-political characteristics of the country in which the conflict was fought, the nature of any third party involvement in the conflict, and the characteristics of the post-conflict environment. The remainder of this chapter will briefly outline the specific hypotheses that will be analysed within each of these categories.

Conflict Characteristics: How the Original Conflict was fought

Conflict Fatalities

When considering recurring civil wars, Walter (2004) found no significant correlation between the intensity of an original conflict and the likelihood of that conflict recurring. However, the findings of studies that have considered the breakdown of negotiated peace settlements contradict this result. Sambanis and Doyle (2000) and Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) have both found that peace settlements are more likely to break down in conflicts of greater intensity. Both studies suggested that conflicts of a high intensity would be more likely to produce entrenched emotions such as resentment and revenge making the conflict particularly difficult to resolve. Additionally, Kalyvas (2000) has found that personal revenge is a primary motivation for individuals to re-enter a civil conflict. Bearing this in mind, it is suggested that the higher the loss of life in a civil war, the greater the level of grievances and chance of subsequent war. These ideas form the basis of the first two hypotheses to be tested in this study:

HYPOTHESIS 1: *Conflicts with higher total fatalities will be more likely to recur than those with lower fatalities.*

HYPOTHESIS 2: *Conflicts of a higher intensity will have a greater probability of recurring.*

Conflict Duration

Given the nature of hypothesis one, it might seem obvious that longer conflicts generate higher fatalities and hence would be more likely to recur. However, Hartzell (2001), Smith and Stam (2003), and Walter (2004) have all found that conflicts of a longer duration are less likely to recur. Physical and resource exhaustion and improved knowledge of an opponent's relative strength are put forward as explanatory factors for this phenomenon.

HYPOTHESIS 3: *Protracted conflicts will be less likely to recur than shorter conflicts.*

Number of Factions

When considering how the number of factions influences the prospects of international co-operation, Oye (1985, p 19-20) suggests three reasons why a greater number of factions will make co-operation difficult. First, an increased number of actors will make the identification of common interests more difficult. Secondly, anticipating the behaviour of other actors becomes increasingly difficult due to the increased number of factors influencing each party's behaviour. Thirdly, deterrence is less effective as retaliation might destabilise the entire system. As a result, groups may be tempted to 'free-ride' and not genuinely co-operate. Sambanis and Doyle (2000) have tested the idea that a greater number of factions will make co-operation more difficult with relation to the success of peace building initiatives in civil war. They found that there was a negative relationship between the number of factions involved in a conflict and the success of peace building initiatives. However, they also found evidence to suggest that as very high numbers of factions emerge, peace building prospects are improved. Given that only one conflict, of the 238 conflicts considered in this research, included more than five factions, this finding will not be considered.

HYPOTHESIS 4: *A greater number of factions involved in a civil war will increase its susceptibility to recurrence.*

Incompatibility

Most literature concerning post-conflict stability classifies conflict incompatibilities as either identity based or politico-economic based. Identity conflicts are thought to be more difficult to resolve as they involve powerful emotional affiliations which are very difficult, and in some cases impossible, to change (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Sambanis & Doyle 2000). The data used in this research uses two classifications of civil war incompatibilities: conflicts which arise over territorial issues and conflicts which arise as a

result of competing claims for the control of government. It is suggested that identity issues are more likely to be attached to territorial conflicts than to conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government. Given that identity based conflicts are more difficult to resolve it is hypothesised that territorial conflicts will be more susceptible to recurrence. Additionally, in conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government the victor will almost inevitably gain control of most mechanisms of the state. This would give them considerable advantage in being able to deter future attacks making conflict recurrence less likely.

HYPOTHESIS 5: *Conflicts which arise over territorial issues will be more likely to recur than those over competing claims for the control of government.*

Episode of the Conflict

This hypothesis considers the relationship between the number of times that a particular conflict has occurred and civil war recurrence. Conflicts which recur on multiple occasions will result in increased fatalities generating issues of distrust and revenge. However, the recurrence of a conflict also means that the combined total duration of the conflict increases and will most likely expose the country to extreme hardship, especially given that the state is already in recovery from an initial conflict. It is suggested that the additional hardship caused by recurring civil war will mean that civil wars in either their second or greater episode will be less likely to experience recurrence. Complex modelling undertaken by Smith and Stam (2003) has suggested that in the event of one conflict leading to a subsequent conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the subsequent conflict. Hence, hypothesis six may only apply when the previous conflict is of a sufficient duration or intensity.

HYPOTHESIS 6: *The likelihood of conflict recurrence reduces with each additional episode of a civil war.*

The Geographic Characteristics of the Conflict

Proximity of the Conflict to an International Border

Buhaug and Gates (2002) have revealed some interesting trends regarding civil conflict and geography; in particular, that conflicts which take place adjacent to an international border are likely to be larger than those that do not. Furthermore, Joes (1996, p 6) suggests that in order for a guerrilla army to be successful they must have a neighbouring country where they can seek sanctuary and store vital supplies. Hence, it would seem likely that when a conflict takes place in close proximity to an international border, rebels can retreat into foreign territory meaning they are better equipped to re-initiate hostilities at a later date.

HYPOTHESIS 7: *Civil wars which are fought in close proximity to an international border will be more likely to recur.*

The Terrain and Isolation of the Battle Zone

Successful guerrilla warfare is also dependent on the ability of rebels to establish secure bases, usually in inaccessible areas a considerable distance from major population centres in mountainous or heavily forested terrain (Joes 1996, p 6). Fearon and Laitin (1999, p 4) have shown that conflicts are more likely to break out in rough terrain, particularly hills and mountains, however they have not yet developed a concise coding for different terrain types. Rather than attempting to develop a coding for different terrain, it was decided to simply measure the distance between the conflict epicentre and the nearest major city under the assumption that rough terrain will be more common in areas isolated from major population centres. Isolated conflicts will experience similar problems to those close to an international border, enabling rebels to disperse and hide before regaining strength and re-initiating hostilities.

HYPOTHESIS 8: *Civil wars which are fought in isolated areas a considerable distance from major population centres will be more likely to recur.*

The size of the Country and the Size of the Battle Zone

It is argued that isolated environments where rebels can retreat and regroup will be more common in countries with a larger land area. Hence, conflicts which occur in larger countries will be more likely to recur as rebel forces will be more capable of finding sanctuary within their country meaning that the achievement of total victory over the opposition will be more difficult. This research will also investigate whether the size of the battle zone (and the size of the battle zone relative to that of the country's land area) influences civil war recurrence. It is suggested that conflicts with a smaller battle zone will be more susceptible to recurrence.

HYPOTHESIS 9: *Conflicts are more likely to recur in countries which have a larger total land area.*

HYPOTHESIS 10: *Conflicts which have a smaller radius will be more likely to recur.*

HYPOTHESIS 11: *Civil wars which have a smaller radius as a fraction of their land area will be more likely to recur.*

Characteristics of the Country in which the Civil War Takes Place

Regime History and Stability

As discussed earlier, civil war outbreak is not directly associated with highly autocratic regimes. Instead, empirical research has shown that civil war is most common when the governing regime is neither highly democratic nor highly authoritarian. Similarly, conflict is also thought to be more common in countries where there is instability in the type of ruling regime, characterised by rapid movement toward or away from democratic governance.

HYPOTHESIS 12: *Civil wars which take place in a country with a mid-range regime type will be more likely to recur than those which are highly democratic or highly autocratic.*

HYPOTHESIS 13: *Regime instability will increase countries' susceptibility to conflict recurrence.*

Ethnic Diversity

Greater ethnic diversity alone has not proven to be a decisive factor in the causes of civil war. For this reason it is suggested that ethnic diversity will not have a substantial influence in determining whether or not a conflict recurs.

HYPOTHESIS 14: *Ethnic diversity will not significantly influence civil war recurrence.*

Total Population

Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 13) have found that the risk of civil war is roughly proportional to population size suggesting that a larger population improves the feasibility of waging a rebellion as there are more potential rebel recruits.

HYPOTHESIS 15: *Higher population levels will increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence.*

Population Density/Distribution

Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 5) also suggest that low population density and low levels of urbanisation will inhibit government capability and increase the risk of civil war outbreak. It is assumed that lower population density and urbanisation will make it more difficult for a government to maintain checks over their population in the post-conflict environment, hence increasing the opportunity for rebels to re-initiate conflicts.

HYPOTHESIS 16: *Countries which have lower population density will be more likely to experience recurring civil war.*

HYPOTHESIS 17: *High rural population figures will make civil war recurrence more likely.*

The Nature of any Third Party Involvement in the Conflict

Foreign Intervention

Walter (2002) has found that a crucial factor in the success of civil war peace settlements is a third-party security guarantee. Combatants will only relinquish military assets

if they can do so without risking a surprise attack during the de-mobilisation process. In order to achieve this they will seek a security guarantee from a third party; this will sometimes come in the form of third party observations which provide the disputants with accurate information as to their opposition's compliance. However, a more common third-party security guarantee involves the third party having the necessary force to deter either party from launching an attack during the peace building process (Walter 2002, pp 26-27). It is suggested that the intervention of a third party in a civil conflict will have a similar effect and reduce the probability of civil war recurrence. In order for a third party to involve itself in a conflict it must clearly have an interest in that conflict ending in a certain way. While this will not necessarily be a resolution that both parties accept, the additional strength added to one side by a third party will sufficiently deter the opposition from re-initiating the conflict.

HYPOTHESIS 18: *The intervention of a third party during a conflict will reduce the probability of conflict recurrence.*

The influence that a third party intervention will have is largely dependent on their power and legitimacy, hence major powers or highly respected international organisations are much more likely to deter future escalations than less capable groups.

HYPOTHESIS 19: *The extent to which a third party will reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence is dependent on their power.*

Post-Conflict Conditions

Means of Resolution

The outcome of a conflict is also likely to influence whether it will recur. Where a conflict ends in a decisive victory for one party, a resumption of that conflict is thought to be less likely for two reasons. First, a comprehensive victory will send a message to other potential challengers that they will face stiff opposition if they choose military confrontation. Secondly, the victor in a civil conflict generally gains full control of the state which allows them to consolidate their power, particularly their strength relative to opposition groups in

society (Wagner 1993, 1994; Zartman 1989, 1995a, cited in Walter 2004, p 374). A conflict which is ended by the signing of some form of treaty is also less likely to recur. While it would be extremely premature to assume that the signing of a treaty means that the conflict has been resolved permanently, it does show that the combatants have at least some desire to move toward resolution (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003; Sambanis & Doyle 2000, p 785).

HYPOTHESIS 20: *Conflicts which end as a result of a decisive military victory will be less likely to recur.*

HYPOTHESIS 21: *The means by which a conflict ends will influence its likelihood of recurrence.*

United Nations Peacekeeping

Literature concerning the success of the United Nations (UN) as a peacekeeping force reveals that historical peacekeeping operations have had mixed results; however the weight of literature suggests that their overall influence is a positive one (Fortna 2004).

HYPOTHESIS 22: *UN Peacekeeping will reduce the chances of civil war recurrence*

Chapter Three

Theoretical and Methodological Approach

Introduction

In the final section of the previous chapter, a number of hypotheses regarding civil war recurrence were introduced. This chapter will provide an outline of the methodological approach that will be used to organise and analyse these hypotheses. It will begin by establishing a clear definition of civil war along with the criteria used to determine whether or not a civil war is classified as having recurred. These definitions are particularly important as they determine which cases will be included in the analysis and hence play a major part in determining the results of the research as a whole. Following this, the contingency framework around which this research is based will be introduced in greater detail. The chapter will finish by providing a more detailed description of how the variables included in the framework will be examined.

Defining Civil War

In order to effectively investigate the causes of recurring civil war, it is first necessary to establish a clear definition of what exactly constitutes a civil war. There are a diverse range of datasets which are currently being used in the study of civil war which use a range of different parameters to define civil war. Three themes which are common to most definitions of civil war can be identified. First, the conflict must involve some form of challenge to a state's sovereignty. Secondly, one of the disputants must be an agent of the state and the other

must be a non-state organisation. Thirdly, each side in the conflict must sustain some proportion of the total fatalities generated in the conflict (so as to exclude genocide and mass murder) (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Licklider 2003; Sarkees 2000; Strand et al. 2005).

One of the major points of difference between the various definitions of civil war centres on the threshold of violence used to differentiate civil wars from other types of violence (Sambanis 2004, p 815). The use of fatality thresholds in civil war definitions is contentious as it tends to create bias against conflicts in countries with a small population which do not meet the threshold but are of substantial importance to the country in which they occur. A potential solution to this problem is the use of a ratio of deaths per head of population. However, this generates further problems as conflicts of high regional importance in larger countries such as China and India would often be excluded due to a seemingly low national importance (Human Security Centre 2003, p 2). A threshold of 1,000 fatalities per year was introduced by Singer and Small (1963) in their seminal Correlates of War dataset. This threshold has been used in a number of subsequent studies (see Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Licklider 2003) and also forms the basis of definitions used in other studies (see Fearon & Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004).

Along with the issue of a fatalities threshold, difficulties are also encountered when determining which types of violence should be coded as civil wars. For example, when considering the Correlates of War dataset, the Dhofar Rebellion which began in 1964 in Oman is not included as it does not meet the threshold of 1,000 battle fatalities, despite the fact that it was a highly organised uprising. Conversely, the rebellion in Somalia in 1991 is included in many datasets because it produced such high fatalities, despite the fact that there was neither a recognised government or an organised rebel force (Human Security Centre 2003, p 1). Other problems with classification include the differentiation between civil conflicts and other forms of internal violence such as terrorism, politicide and genocide (Human Security Centre 2003, p 1).

In an effort to avoid inconsistencies in civil war datasets, a number of new datasets are being formulated using different classifications of violence. Wolfgang Schreiber (2003) and other scholars from Hamburg University have established a dataset that uses no threshold number of deaths but rather estimates the sustainability of violence. Other datasets such as The State Failure Project (Marshall & Gurr 2003) and the Political Terror Scale (Cornett & Gibney 2003) have moved toward categorising internal conflicts along a continuum based on a more holistic analysis of levels of political violence.

The definition of civil war used in this research is the same as that used by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (PRIO) and the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW). PRIO/CSCW define civil conflict as a "contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Strand et al. 2005, p 3). The individual elements of this definition can be broken down further in order to give a more precise meaning to the definition. "Armed force" refers to the use of manufactured and natural weapons to promote a party's general position in a conflict. An opposition organisation is defined as any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force (Strand et al. 2005, p 3-4).

The threshold of 25 fatalities is definitely low, especially when compared with the threshold of 1,000 fatalities per year as used in the Correlates of War dataset (Singer & Small 1963). The creators of the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset argue that a threshold of 1,000 fatalities is too high as it excludes important cases such as the Basque conflict in Spain (Gleditsch et al. 2002, p 617). As a result, they decided to set the fatality threshold at 25 so as to ensure that all politically significant events were recorded without cluttering the dataset with exceedingly small incidents (Gleditsch et al. 2002, p 617).

There are three major reasons behind the decision to use the PRIO/CSCW definition of civil war and dataset in this research. First, given the large number of small states in the

international system, a conflict which produces 25 fatalities will represent a very significant incident in many smaller states. Secondly, the lower fatality threshold used in the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset generates more cases so is better suited to statistical analysis. Finally, given the extent of globalisation in today's world, relatively small episodes of violence can have profound effects throughout the world. For example, recent violence in East Timor which would probably fail even to meet the threshold of 25 fatalities has thrown the entire country into turmoil and has attracted a UN mandated peacekeeping force composed of troops from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal.

Definition of Recurring Civil War

Having established a concise definition of civil war, it is now necessary to determine what classifies as a *recurring* civil war. Accomplishing this requires a clear conception of when a conflict begins and ends. The obvious answer to this question is that a conflict begins when the killing commences and ends when the combatants stop killing one another. When considering recurring civil war however, this simple rule is not always sufficient. Several questions remain: how long must a cessation in fatalities last in order for a resumption of hostilities to be classified as an entirely new conflict and what characteristics must a conflict exhibit in order for it to be classified as a recurring civil conflict?

In this research, a conflict begins according to the criteria set out in the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset. The start of a conflict is recorded as the first year in which fatalities reached at least 25 and ends in the final year where at least 25 fatalities result from the conflict (Strand et al. 2005, p 11). This research uses a strict definition of what constitutes a recurring civil war. It was originally planned to also use a broader definition which would have allowed a comparative analysis between recurrence of a specific conflict and recurrence of conflict within a country in general. However it was decided that this was beyond the scope of the research and hence the focus of the research should concentrate specifically on recurrences which met a stricter definition.

Definition

A civil war is deemed to have recurred if the original conflict ends (fatalities failing to reach 25 in a year) and recurs (25 fatalities are recorded within a year) within ten years of the original conflict ending. The broad issue at stake in the conflict must be the same as in the original conflict and at least one of the non-governmental opposition factions must be the same as in the previous conflict. The separate elements of this definition will be operationalised further:

Between one and ten years of peace (where fatalities fail to reach 25):

Most civil war lists will specify an arbitrary period of time such as two or five years in order for a conflict to be classified as ended (Fearon 2004b, p 279). Given the relatively low fatality threshold used in this research, it was decided that one year in which fatalities failed to reach 25 would be a reasonable indication that the conflict had come to some form of conclusion. In order for a conflict to be classified as recurring, the second outbreak of violence must occur within ten years of the final year of the original conflict. The ten year time-frame was selected because if a conflict recurs after a period of more than ten years, even if the organisations and the issues are the same, there will probably be a new generation of soldiers involved in the fighting. Therefore, it is likely that the conflict would have acquired a different meaning to the original conflict at its commencement.

Both the incompatibility and the non-governmental factions must be the same:

In this definition the incompatibility (the root cause of the conflict) must be the same as in the preceding conflict. Additionally, at least one of the non-governmental factions which fought in the original conflict must also participate in the subsequent conflict. Essentially, this means that any recurrence of a conflict must effectively be the same as the preceding conflict. The requirement that at least one of the opposition groups must have been a combatant in the preceding conflict does have some disadvantages. In many conflicts the opposition group changes its name, but the personnel and organisation of the group remains essentially unchanged. Due to the difficulties of detecting where this has occurred there may be some

cases where conflicts have recurred and for all intents and purposes are the same as the preceding conflict yet are not included in this analysis as recurring conflicts.

Theoretical Framework

The framework used to analyse the problem of recurring civil war has already been introduced in the introductory chapter of this work. It is based on Bercovitch's Contingency Model of Conflict Mediation (Bercovitch & Wells 1993) which was originally developed to assess how different factors influence the success of efforts to mediate violent conflicts[1]. The framework, as used in this research, stipulates that conflict recurrence is a factor of a number of pre-existing contextual conditions in existence prior to the outbreak of the conflict, factors relating to how the civil war was fought, and variables pertaining to the post-conflict environment. The dependant variable which this research aims to explain is whether or not a civil war will recur. The contingency model (see Figure 3.1) specifies clusters of independent variables which are assumed to have some influence on civil war recurrence. Each of the independent variables in Figure 3.1 pertains to at least one of the hypothesised ideas regarding civil war recurrence which were presented in the latter part of the previous chapter. 'Antecedent' conditions refer to the pre-existing conditions inherent in the country in which the conflict takes place and the nature of the conflict which has already occurred. As shown in Figure 3.1, the clusters of antecedent variables are grouped according to characteristics of the conflict, geographic features of the battle zone, characteristics of the state in which the conflict took place (ethno-political factors) and the nature of any third party involvement in the conflict. The 'current conditions' in this framework represent the variables associated with the way in which the original conflict came to an end and the post-conflict environment. It is argued that a combination of antecedent conditions and current conditions will be influential in determining whether or not a conflict will recur. If the conflict does recur then the historical aspects of the conflict will influence the likelihood of any subsequent conflict recurrence. This relationship is

[1] For a full copy of Bercovitch's Contingency Framework, see Appendix A.

shown in Figure 3.1 by the arrow connecting civil war recurrence with antecedent conditions. The box entitled "other variables" is included simply to acknowledge that variables other than those included in the framework may also influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

Figure 3.1: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence



The contingency model provides a clear organisational framework which enables the consideration of factors which make civil war recurrence more or less likely in an empirical fashion and can be reproduced using different data and variables. Following the analysis of the independent variables, insignificant variables will be removed from the framework so as to leave only the most relevant factors.

Methodology

The pros and cons of using a statistical methodology in the study of civil war were discussed in the previous chapter. While it is clear that both approaches have distinct advantages, a statistical approach is clearly better suited to this research given that the primary objective of the research is to produce a set of general rules regarding civil war recurrence which can be applied to future conflicts. Hence, the independent variables shown in the above framework will be tested using a large number of cases selected from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset.

Civil wars from version three[1] of the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset were selected and then divided into those cases which had recurred and those which had not. The PRIO/CSCW dataset includes all civil wars which meet their definition (see page 46) that were fought between 1946 and 2004. Given that conflicts were only classified as non-recurring if they were followed by at least ten years of peace, conflicts which ended after 1994 could not be included in the analysis as "non-recurring conflicts". This is because the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset is only updated to the end of 2004, meaning that it is impossible to show whether conflicts which ended after 1994 have been followed by ten years without recurrence. All other conflicts from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset were included generating a list of 238 conflicts, 83 of which had recurred on at least one occasion and 155

[1] Since the commencement of this research, a fourth version of the Armed Conflict Dataset has been published that has been updated to include information for the year 2005.

which were isolated incidents[1]. Having obtained a suitable sample of conflicts, a number of explanatory variables (one for each hypothesis) were added to the dataset with the aim of finding evidence in support of the hypotheses set out in the previous chapter. While some of these variables were simply copied from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset, others were collected from a range of different sources. The details of how each variable was operationalised and collected will be outlined in the following chapter along with the results of the single variant analysis. Chapter Five will then consider how different variables relate to civil war recurrence when they are tested in clusters using binary logistic regression.

[1] For a full list of the conflicts included in this analysis, see Appendix B.

Chapter Four

Analysis of Individual Variables

Introduction

The primary focus of this chapter is to investigate a series of hypotheses regarding civil war recurrence (see Chapter Two, pages 36 – 43). Hypotheses will be discussed according to the different subheadings listed in the Contingency Framework of Conflict Recurrence (see Figure 4.1).

Each hypothesis will be considered in turn covering three major points. First, the variables used to test the hypothesis will be operationalised and the process by which they were collected will be described. Secondly, hypotheses will be tested using single variant analysis. Spearman's Rank Order correlations will be used to determine the direction and the strength of the relationship between the independent variables (such as conflict fatalities) and the dependent variable (whether or not the civil war recurs). Significant correlations ($p = >0.05$) are marked with an asterisk. This analysis considers the influence of the variable that is being tested in isolation and assumes that all other factors are equal. Hence, although this analysis is useful, it only provides an indication of the relationship between different variables and civil war recurrence. A more realistic explanation can be generated through multivariate analysis (which considers the impact of a number of variables simultaneously) which is undertaken in the following chapter. Finally, the results of the Rank Order Correlations will be considered with reference to the literature upon which the hypotheses were based.

Figure 4.1: Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence



Conflict Characteristics: How the Original Conflict was Fought

One of the primary lines of reasoning concerning civil war recurrence is that the way in which a conflict is fought will play a major role in influencing whether or not that conflict

recurs (Walter 2004, p 373). Variables relating to how the original conflict was fought form one of the important categories of antecedent variables in the framework of analysis used in this research. The way in which the original conflict was fought will influence both intangible and concrete motivations for re-initiating or avoiding future conflict. For example, the nature of some conflicts might leave combatants particularly eager to seek revenge while conflicts of a different nature might leave former combatants physically incapable of resuming hostilities. Six variables pertaining to the nature of the original conflict will be examined: the number of fatalities, the intensity of the conflict, conflict duration, the number of competing factions, the cause of the conflict, and the episode of the conflict. These variables provide a broad description of how conflicts were fought and will enable us to show whether particular types of violence are more susceptible to recurrence than others.

HYPOTHESIS 1: *Conflicts with higher total fatalities will be more likely to recur than those with lower fatalities.*

HYPOTHESIS 2: *Conflicts of a higher intensity will have a greater probability of recurring.*

To test these hypotheses, data on the total fatalities in all conflicts was collected from Lacina and Gleditsch's (2005) Battle Deaths Dataset. This dataset includes statistics on fatalities in all of the conflicts included in the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset and was produced in conjunction with the Centre for the Study of Civil War. The fatalities recorded in this dataset are referred to as "combatant deaths" and are defined as "all people, soldiers and civilians, killed in combat" (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 148). This is distinct from what Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) refer to as combatant fatalities and war fatalities. Combatant fatalities are defined as "the number of battle connected fatalities *among military personnel*" (emphasis added) (Sarkees 2000, cited in Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 128). Conversely, war fatalities refer to "all people killed in battle as well as all those whose deaths were the result of the changed social conditions caused by the war" (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 4). While each of these definitions has important uses, they both suffer from problems which limit their use

when trying to determine the scale and nature of a conflict. Combatant deaths do not provide an accurate measure of the scope of a conflict given the nature of modern conflict where the lines between civilians and soldiers are often blurred. On the other hand, war deaths provide a better indication of the total suffering caused by a conflict, however the classification is problematic; it is nearly impossible to determine whether or not certain problems which often occur in conjunction with civil war such as disease and famine would have occurred in the absence of the conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch 2005, p 147-149).

Total battle fatalities were calculated by adding together the fatalities from each year of the conflict as recorded in Lacina and Gleditsch's dataset. Given that the duration of the civil wars in this dataset ranged from one to 44 years, the total fatalities in a conflict only provides a partial representation of the nature of the conflict. A conflict which generated 10,000 fatalities but had a duration of just one year will have a vastly different complexion to a conflict which generated 10,000 fatalities over the course of 20 or 30 years. For this reason it was decided to also investigate the relationship between the intensity of a conflict and recurrence. Conflict intensity was calculated by dividing the total fatalities in each conflict by the duration (in years) of the conflict.

Due to the considerable variation in the number of fatalities (ranging from 25 to over two million) and the presence of some distorting outliers, the data regarding both total fatalities and conflict intensity was transformed by taking the square root of each figure. Using this data the mean fatalities in recurring conflicts equalled 53.9 while in non-recurring conflicts they equalled 79.6. There is a very weak negative correlation between higher levels of fatalities and a lower likelihood of civil war recurrence [r= -.051, n= 238, p= .433]. The mean intensity of recurring conflicts equalled 26.8 while in non-recurring conflicts it was 83.9. Similarly, there is also a weak correlation between higher conflict intensity and a lower chance of conflict recurrence [r= -.104, n= 238, p= .108].

These results do not support the hypotheses that greater fatalities and intensity will increase the likelihood of civil war recurrence. The weak relationship which is revealed with

both variables is the opposite to the proposed hypotheses which were based on the rationale that conflicts which generated higher fatalities would create deeply entrenched resentment making conflicts more difficult to resolve and more likely to recur. Instead, these findings suggest that increased intensity and fatalities might generate military, physical and emotional exhaustion which would generate an impediment to the resumption of a conflict. A second potential explanation for this finding is that increased intensity and fatalities will generate abhorrence toward civil conflict making the prospect of further warfare particularly unappealing.

HYPOTHESIS 3: *Protracted conflicts will be less likely to recur than shorter conflicts.*

Bearing in mind Collier et al's claim (2004, p 253) that civil wars have an average duration of seven years compared with a mean duration of just 11 months for international wars (Bennett & Stam 1996), much consideration has been given to the duration of civil wars and why some conflicts last so much longer than others. Hence, it is also important to consider what impact civil war duration has on conflict recurrence.

The duration of conflict was collected directly from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset and recorded to the nearest year. As with the previous two variables there was a substantial range in the duration of conflicts, from a low of one year through to the 44 year long separatist conflict in Burma involving the Karen ethnic group. As a result, the square root of conflict durations was taken so as to provide a more normal distribution. Using the square root transformed data, the mean duration of recurring conflicts is 1.70 years while in non-recurring conflicts it is 1.55 years. There was no correlation to speak of between conflict duration and conflict recurrence [r= .066, n= 238, p= .309]. Hence, it would appear that hypothesis three is incorrect; based on this analysis conflict duration does not have any significant impact on conflict recurrence.

This finding contradicts those of Hartzell (2001), Smith and Stam (2003), and Walter (2004) who have all found that conflicts with a longer duration are less likely to recur. The

most likely explanation for this digression is the different data which is used in each study. Walter's findings were generated using the Correlates of War dataset which has a fatality threshold of 1,000 and 58 cases; this research uses the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset which has a fatality threshold of just 25 and 238 cases.

HYPOTHESIS 4: *A greater number of factions involved in a civil war will increase its susceptibility to recurrence.*

Sambanis and Doyle (2000, p 789) found a robust negative relationship between the number of factions and peace building success. Supporting this finding is a strong theoretical argument which suggests that greater numbers of factions will potentially generate a greater number of preferences. The greater the diversity of preferences, the less likely it is that all preferences can be accommodated in the post-conflict environment (Oye 1985). Put simply, the greater the number of competing factions, the greater the number of competing issues. As a result, at the conclusion of a conflict, there are increased chances of one party being dissatisfied with the outcome and once again resorting to armed conflict.

The data regarding the number of factions was taken from the PRIO/CSCW dataset. The number of factions simply represents the number of opposition groups involved in the hostilities. The mean number of factions in conflicts which did recur was 1.34 compared with 1.29 in non-recurring conflicts. There was very little correlation between the number of factions in a conflict and the likelihood of that conflict recurring [r= -.021, n= 238, p= .747]. Hence, while the direction of this relationship is concurrent with the findings of Sambanis and Doyle (2000) the strength of the relationship is not.

There are several plausible explanations for this variation in results. The most obvious is that different datasets were used. Sambanis and Doyle have compiled their own dataset of civil wars which has the requirement of 1,000 deaths throughout the course of the conflict generating a dataset of 124 case compared to the considerably lower threshold used in this analysis (25 fatalities per year generating 238 cases). Another possible explanation which

should be considered is that the PRIO/CSCW dataset from which the information regarding the number of factions involved in each conflict was taken only includes the *major* factions which were involved in armed conflict. As a result there is very little variation in between the number of factions involved in different conflicts. It is likely that there are many smaller factions which were not included in this dataset along with interested factions which were not actually involved in the hostilities. The development of a more detailed dataset which included a more comprehensive list of civil war factions might well produce different results to those found in this research. It should also be remembered that Sambanis and Doyle (2000) were only considering the influence of the number of factions on peace building success, not civil war recurrence. It is possible that the factors which pose difficulties in the peace building process are different to those which increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence.

HYPOTHESIS 5: *Conflicts which arise over territorial issues will be more likely to recur than those over competing claims for the control of government.*

It is argued that for two reasons, conflicts arising over territorial issues will be more likely to recur. First, previous empirical research has found that conflicts arising over identity issues[1] are much harder to resolve, hence the assumption is made that they will be more likely to recur (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Sambanis & Doyle 2000). Secondly, when conflict emerges over issues pertaining to the control of the government, the victor in the conflict will inevitably gain control of the mechanisms of the state, hence increasing their power to deter future attacks. The data used to test this hypothesis was also taken directly from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset. Out of 238 conflicts, 106 (44.5%) were territorial while 132 (55.5%) were fought for control of the government.

[1] This research distinguishes between territorial conflicts and conflicts arising over competition for the control of government when describing the incompatibilities causing civil war. The assumption is made and explained in Chapter Two, that conflicts arising over territorial issues are more likely to be associated with identity issues than those arising over competition for the control of government.

It was found that conflicts over territorial issues were much more likely to recur than conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government. Disputed territorial issues were the root cause of 67.5% of conflicts which recurred while the remaining 32.5% of recurring conflicts were a result of competition to control government. When looking at conflicts which did not recur, the exact opposite proved to be the case. Competition for the control of government was the key incompatibility in 67.5% of these conflicts while territorial issues accounted for the remaining 32.5% of non-recurring conflicts. The results of Spearman's Rank Order correlations showed a moderate positive correlation between territorial conflicts and conflict recurrence [r= .338, n= 238, p= .000*]. The inverse result applied to conflicts arising over competing claims for the control of government with a medium negative correlation between conflict recurrence and conflicts arising over control of government [r= -.338, n= 238, p= .000*]. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that conflicts arising over territorial issues are more likely to recur than conflicts arising over competition for the control of government. It also supports the theoretical ideas that conflicts over identity issues will be more difficult to resolve and that the comparative advantage gained by victorious sides in conflicts over the control of government will make future conflict less likely.

HYPOTHESIS 6: *The likelihood of conflict recurrence increases with each additional episode of a civil war.*

There are two competing theoretical ideas regarding this hypothesis, both of which share similarities with those regarding civil war duration. The first is that civil war economically and socially destabilises a country and creates resentment and feelings of bitterness which makes civil war recurrence more likely as the incidence of the conflict increases. The second is that civil war exhausts a country both physically and in terms of resources producing an abhorrence toward further conflict which makes the recurrence of civil war less likely with each episode of a conflict. It is hypothesised that the first of these two theoretical ideas is more accurate as many civil wars do not require significant resources and

most developing countries have an ample supply of young males meaning that exhaustion of man power and resources is unlikely to occur.

To test this hypothesis, the number of times each conflict recurred (using the definition discussed in the previous chapter) was recorded. There was a range in the number of recurrences from zero to five. Table 4.1 clearly shows that as the episode of a conflict increases the number of conflicts decreases. However, to determine whether the episode of a conflict has an impact on whether or not that conflict recurs, it is necessary to calculate what percentage of conflicts which recur one time, recur a subsequent time and what percentage of conflicts which recur for a second time recur a third time and so on. The results of these calculations are displayed in Table 4.2 and show that of all conflicts included in the dataset, 35% recurred at least once, and of those conflicts 41% recurred a second time. Given that there is not a large range in the number of conflict episodes it is difficult to establish a clear trend, however, it would appear that to a point, increased episode does increase the likelihood of subsequent recurrence. This trend is obviously only visible up to a certain point (the fourth episode) after which the likelihood of recurrence drops to 17% (after which there is no further recurrence).

Table 4.1: Conflict Episode and Recurrence

Episode of Recurrence	1	2	3	4	5
Number of Occurrences	49	20	7	6	1

Table 4.2: Conflict Episode and Likelihood of Recurrence

Episode of Recurrence	1	2	3	4	5
Number of Occurrences	35%	41%	35%	86%	17%

When considering the two theoretical ideas regarding civil war episode, it would appear that to an extent, both are correct. Civil war inevitably does destabilise a country and will often generate deeply engrained resentment. As a result, conflicts are likely to recur on multiple occasions. This rule however is only valid to a certain extent, after several episodes of a

conflict, exhaustion and other problems associated with civil war begin to take their toll. Further conflict becomes an increasingly heinous prospect and likelihood of further recurrences begins to reduce. Hence, the likelihood of civil war recurrence relative to episode could be described as an 'inverse U' relationship.

Geographic Characteristics: the Environment in which the Original Conflict Took Place

Along with the nature of the original conflict, geographic factors may also provide important clues as to why some civil wars are particularly susceptible to recurrence. While the importance of geography has long been recognised in the study of international conflict, research considering the influence of geographic factors in civil wars is relatively sparse. In one of the few studies which focuses on the geography of civil wars, Buhaug and Gates (2002) found that geographic factors had a significant impact on both the duration of civil wars and how civil wars end. However, this study did not consider geographic factors in relation to civil war recurrence. For this reason, a second group of antecedent variables will be analysed which includes the specific geographic characteristics of the battle zone along with the geographic characteristics of the relevant country as a whole. Five variables relating to the geographic characteristics of a conflict will be analysed; the location of the battle zone (both in relation to the nearest major population centre and the closest international border), the total land area of the country in which the conflict is fought, the radius of the battle zone, and the radius of the battle zone relative to the size of the country.

HYPOTHESIS 7: *Civil wars which are fought in close proximity to an international border are more likely to recur.*

Joes (1996, p 6) suggests that guerrilla armies are most successful when they can seek sanctuary and store vital supplies, particularly weaponry, in a neighbouring country. Based on

this logic, it is suggested that civil wars which are fought in close proximity to international borders are more likely to recur, as rebels can cross into neighbouring countries to rejuvenate and re-equip themselves before re-initiating hostilities at a later date. The location of each conflict is recorded in the PRIO/CSCW dataset; each conflict is assigned a centre point by its geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude). For each conflict, the distance between the conflict centre point and the closest part of an international border was measured using MapQuest's online atlas (MapQuest 2006). The square root of this figure was again taken to ensure a normal distribution. This measurement makes the assumption that the closest part of an international border can actually be reached and permeated by guerrilla armies.

Using square root transformed data, the mean distance from the nearest international border of a recurring conflict was 12.17 km compared with the marginally higher figure of 13.28 km in conflicts which did not recur. There was a very weak negative correlation between the distance of civil conflicts to the nearest international border and conflict recurrence [r= -.115, n= 238, p= .077]. Therefore while the initial hypothesis is not contradicted, the correlation is very weak indicating that the distance to the nearest international border alone is not an important variable in determining whether or not a conflict recurs.

From an initial consideration, the findings concerning this variable might seem surprising given that both recurring and non-recurring conflicts have a centre-point over 200 kms away from the nearest international border.[1] However, the radii of battle zones were also measured (and are considered later in this chapter) and it was found that the mean radius of conflicts was 256.6 km and 263.9 km in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. Hence, although the centre-point of conflicts is generally a significant distance from international borders, in most cases some of the fighting, particularly in the periphery of the battle zone, will be undertaken considerably closer to the border than the centre-point of the conflict would suggest.

[1] Prior to taking the square root of this variable, the mean distance from the conflict epicentre to the nearest international border was 206.2km and 225.1km in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively.

HYPOTHESIS 8: *Civil wars which are fought in isolated areas a considerable distance from major population centres will be more likely to recur.*

Fearon and Laitin (1999, p 4) have shown that conflicts are more likely to break out in rough terrain, particularly hills and mountains. As yet, however, they have not developed a concise coding for different terrain types. Rather than attempting to develop a coding for different terrain, it was decided to simply measure the distance between the conflict epicentre and the nearest major city. The assumption is made here that the types of terrain that are conducive to civil war will be more common in areas isolated from major population centres. It is suggested that conflicts in these isolated areas will experience similar problems to those close to an international border where, if overpowered, rebels can disperse and hide before regaining strength and re-initiating hostilities. The extent to which a conflict is isolated was measured by taking the PRIO/CSCW centre-point and measuring the distance from that point to the nearest city in the same country with a population of at least 500,000. In countries where there were no cities that large, the distance to the capital city was measured.

Using square-root transformed data, a distinct difference was revealed between the location of recurring conflicts and non-recurring conflicts relative to the nearest major city. In conflicts which recurred, the mean distance from the conflict epicentre to the nearest major city was 21.90 km while in conflicts which did not recur the figure was much lower at just 13.68 km. There was a moderate positive correlation between the distance of the conflict from the nearest major city and conflict recurrence [r= .356, n= 238, p= .000*]. Hence, the hypothesis that conflicts which are fought in more isolated areas are more likely to recur is supported.

HYPOTHESIS 9: *Conflicts are more likely to recur in countries which have a larger total land area.*

Based on similar logic to the previous hypothesis it is suggested that when conflicts take place in larger countries, in the face of strong state opposition, rebels will disperse over a wide area making their elimination more difficult. As a result, rebels will be more likely to

regroup at a later date and reinitiate hostilities. The land area of all states used to test this hypothesis was collected from the CIA World Factbook (CIA Factbook 2006)[1]. There was a huge variation in the size of countries which have experienced civil war, ranging from tiny countries such as Comoros which has a land area of just 2,170 km^2 through to the USSR with a land area of 2,240,220 km^2.

Using square root transformed data, the mean land area of states in which conflicts recurred was 1146.5 km^2 as opposed to 944.1 km^2 in states where conflicts did not recur. Spearman's Rank Order Correlation shows a moderate positive correlation between increased land area and conflict recurrence [r= .242, n= 238, p= .000*]. This correlation shows that when considered in isolation, the land area of the country in which a civil war takes place does have a noteworthy influence in determining whether or not that conflict recurs. This result is particularly interesting because the total land area of countries has not been considered an important variable in other studies which consider recurring civil war.

HYPOTHESIS 10: *Conflicts which have a smaller radius will be more likely to recur.*

There are two plausible ideas regarding the radius of a conflict and how it might influence civil war recurrence. The first is that conflicts with a larger radius will involve fighting that is spread over a large area meaning that overcoming all facets of the opposition is more difficult. As a result, it is possible for those groups of rebels which have not been actively defeated to regroup and reinitiate hostilities at a later date. A second theory is that conflicts which take place over a larger land area are more likely to generate a high intensity, traditional style of warfare which is more likely to produce an outright victory and hence less likely to recur. This is compared with a small scale guerrilla type conflict which is unlikely to generate large scale warfare and hence prone to drag on for a number of years, often recurring at least once.

[1] Except in the cases where the country's territory had changed since the conflict (as is the case with some of the early conflicts in the USSR). In these cases the land area figures were gathered from a range of different sources.

The data concerning the radii of conflicts was collected from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset. The dataset defines conflict radius as "the largest geographic extent of the conflict zone from the centre point during the course of the conflict" (Strand et al. 2005, p 14). The radius is measured at 50km intervals, and makes the unrealistic assumption that a conflict is circular when in reality conflicts are more likely to follow natural contours such as mountains, rivers and international borders (Strand et al. 2005, p 14).

Using square root transformed data there was very little difference between the mean radius of recurring and non-recurring conflicts. The mean radius of recurring conflicts was 14.9km while in non-recurring conflicts it was 14.6km. Unsurprisingly there was only a very insignificant correlation between conflict recurrence and the radius of the conflict [r= .045, n= 238, p= .486]. Hence, it seems clear that this variable does not play a significant role in determining whether or not a conflict recurs.

HYPOTHESIS 11: *Civil wars which have a smaller radius as a fraction of their land area will be more likely to recur.*

In light of the absence of any significant findings concerning the radius of the conflict, it was decided to put this variable in context by comparing the size of the conflict area with the size of the country in which the civil war is taking place. A seemingly small conflict in a large country such as China would have a totally different impact on a smaller state, such as Burundi. To do this, the radius of the conflict was divided by the total land area of the country in which the conflict took place. The result was multiplied by 100 and the square root of this figure was taken.

The radius of conflicts which did recur as a percentage of the country's total land area had a mean of 0.194%. The mean radius as a percentage of land area in civil wars which did not recur was significantly higher at 0.276%. There was a moderate negative correlation between the fraction of a state's total land area in which the conflict actually took place and conflict recurrence [r= -.215, n= 238, p= .001*]. This shows that although there is little

difference between the total radius of recurring and non-recurring conflicts, conflicts which are more geographically concentrated relative to the size of the state in which they occur are more likely to recur. This finding supports the theoretical idea that small scale, guerrilla-style conflicts are more difficult for governments to overcome and as a result are more susceptible to recurrence.

Ethno-Political Factors: Characteristics of the Country where the Conflict is Fought

Research into the factors which make countries susceptible to civil war tends to focus on the political environment in which the conflict broke out. The analysis of the following variables will consider similar variables and the impact that they have on civil war recurrence. Factors such as the demographic and ethnic composition of the country are predicted to influence the way in which conflicts are fought and the ease with which hostilities can be re-ignited. The results from this analysis can be directly compared with research studying the outbreak of civil wars. Six ethno-political variables will be analysed: regime type, regime stability, total population, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, population density and the rural-urban composition of the population.

HYPOTHESIS 12: *Civil wars which take place in a country with a mid-range regime type will be more likely to recur than those which are highly democratic or highly autocratic.*

HYPOTHESIS 13: *Regime instability will increase countries' susceptibility to conflict recurrence.*

Much effort has been expended in considering the relationship between regime type and susceptibility to civil war. While there is still some controversy regarding this issue there is a relatively strong body of literature emerging which suggests that civil wars are more common in countries which have a 'mid-range' regime type (Hegre et al. 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002;

Ellingsen, 2000). The term 'mid-range' is used here to describe regimes which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic. Given that countries with mid-range regimes are more susceptible to civil war it was decided to test whether countries with a history of such regimes are also more susceptible to civil war recurrence.

Data relating to regime type was collected from the fourth edition of the Polity dataset (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002). The Polity dataset was originally collected in 1975 under the direction of Robert Gurr and has been updated on many occasions subsequently, with the fourth edition released in 2004. During this time, the Polity datasets have become the most widely used source for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 5). The two variables of particular interest in the Polity dataset are those which measure the levels of democracy and autocracy. The Polity dataset defines democracy as primarily conceived of three essential, interdependent elements. First, the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 17). Based on these three elements, each state is assigned a score from 0-10. The Polity dataset defines an autocratic state as one which "restricts or suppresses competitive political participation (and whose) chief executives are chosen in a regularised process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints" (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2002, p 18). Using three key indicators: the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation and the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; states are ranked between 0-10. From the autocracy and democracy scales each country is given an overall score between -10 (highly autocratic) and +10 (highly democratic) for each year since 1800.

The goal when testing this variable was to establish whether the regime type influenced the likelihood of civil war recurrence. To do this, the mean Polity score in the five years

leading up to the original outbreak of conflicts was calculated in order to show the political environment in which the conflict broke out. The mean Polity score was also calculated for the five year period following the end of the civil war. Using this data the differences between pre- and post-conflict regime types were calculated. The results of this analysis are summarised in the Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3: Pre- and Post-Conflict Polity Scores and Regime Stability

	Mean Pre-Conflict Polity Score	Mean Post-Conflict Polity Score	Change (Regime Stability)
Recurring Conflicts	-1.19	-0.53	0.66
Non-Recurring Conflicts	-2.97	-2.63	0.34

When looking at the period prior to the outbreak of a civil war, the average Polity score in states which experienced recurring civil war was -1.19. In states where conflicts did not recur, the mean Polity score prior to the conflict emerging was -2.97. There is a very weak positive correlation between higher Polity scores and conflict recurrence [r= .113, n= 238, p= .083]. This result supports the hypothesis that states with a mid-range regime type are more prone to conflict recurrence than highly autocratic/democratic regimes; however, the trend established here is not strong enough to clearly support this idea.

The mean Polity score in the five years following the initial conflict[1] was also recorded in order to investigate the relationship between the post-conflict regime type and conflict recurrence. The mean post-conflict Polity score in the years following conflicts which eventually did recur was -0.53, while in conflicts which did not recur, the mean post-conflict Polity score was -2.63. There is a moderate positive correlation between a higher post-conflict Polity score and civil war recurrence which was significant at the 0.05 level [r= .156, n= 238,

[1] When the conflict recurred in less than five years, the mean Polity score was recorded in the years of peace following the initial conflict.

p= .016*]. Conflicts which recurred had Polity scores both prior to and after the initial outbreak of the conflict that were closer to zero (the mid-point between a democratic and autocratic regime) than conflicts which did not recur. This finding supports the hypothesis that conflicts which take place in the context of a mid-range regime type are more likely to recur, however the finding was only statistically significant when considering the post-conflict Polity conditions.

The analysis of regime stability (as measured by the change between pre- and post-conflict Polity scores) also revealed some interesting results. The average Polity score in states which experienced recurring civil war increased by 0.66 from a pre-conflict mean of -1.19 to a post-conflict mean of 0.53. In states where conflicts did not recur, the mean Polity score increased by 0.34 from a pre-conflict mean of -2.97 to a post-conflict mean of -2.63. There is a very weak positive correlation between increased regime instability and civil war recurrence [r= .089, n= 238, p= .172]. Again, the direction of this relationship supports the hypothesis regarding civil war recurrence and regime instability, however, the trend established is not strong.

The differences between pre- and post-conflict Polity scores were 0.66 and 0.34 in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. The fact that in both recurring and non-recurring conflicts the Polity conditions were marginally less autocratic in the period following the conflict than prior to the conflict could be interpreted as meaning that civil war helps countries to become more democratic. In reality however, this slight increase in political freedom is lower than the global rate at which countries have shifted away from highly autocratic governments during the time frame of this study[1]. Hence civil war is not a force which encourages democratic reform.

[1] The mean duration of the civil wars examined in this research is 3.84 years, during this time the mean increase in polity scores for countries which experienced civil war was 0.46. The average increase in polity scores over the time period of this study for all countries (regardless of whether or not they experienced civil war) was 0.61 every 3.84 years (Shackman 2006).

HYPOTHESIS 14: *Ethnic diversity will not significantly influence civil war recurrence.*

There is a reasonable level of consensus among civil war scholars that ethnic diversity alone is not a variable which significantly contributes to the outbreak of civil war. Based on this theory it is suggested that conflicts fought in countries with high ethic diversity will *not* be more likely to recur than those in countries where there is low ethnic diversity. To test this hypothesis, data was collected from an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) (Annett 2001). The ELF Index used in this research was collated by Anthony Annett; ELF measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the country in question will not belong to the same ethnic group. It does not include any measure of the level of antagonism between ethnic groups. Countries are classified between 0.00 and 0.99 with higher values reflecting a greater degree of fractionalisation. For example, Norway has a very low level of ethnic fractionalisation with a score of 0.05 while India has one of the highest scores with 0.90. The figures which were used are an average taken from 1960 through to 1989; this time frame is generally consistent with the time frame that is used in this research. ELF scores ranged from 0.00 (South Korea) through to 0.93 (Uganda) (Annett 2001, p 573).

The mean ELF score for states which experienced recurring civil war was 0.70, while in states which experienced civil war which did not recur the mean ELF score was 0.56. The Spearman Rank Order correlation showed a moderate positive correlation between higher ELF scores and civil war recurrence [r= .272, n= 205, p= .000*]. Hence, in isolation, there is a clear trend that conflicts which occur in countries with a greater level of ethnic diversity are more likely to recur. A likely explanation for this phenomenon is that although ethnicity does not play a major role in the initial outbreak of conflict, once a civil war has emerged it will often manifest along ethnic lines, and it is this added dimension to the conflict which makes recurrence more likely.

HYPOTHESIS 15: *Higher population levels will increase susceptibility to civil war recurrence.*

While testing the 'greed versus grievance' argument, Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 13) found that the risk of civil conflict was roughly proportional to population size. The exact reason for this trend is not clear but Collier and Hoeffler suggest that both grievances and the opportunities for waging a rebellion increase with population. Based on these findings it was hypothesised that conflicts which take place in countries with larger populations would be more likely to recur than those which take place in countries with smaller populations.

The data concerning population figures for the various countries which experienced civil war was collected from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs which lists the population for all states at five year intervals dating back to 1950 (United Nations 2006b). The population of each state which experienced civil war was recorded at the closest five year interval to the end of the conflict (the decision was made to record the population at the end of the conflict as in some cases population figures had changed significantly during the war, either from natural population growth or the fatalities incurred as a result of the conflict).

The total population in states which experienced recurring civil war had a mean of 337.04 while the mean population in states which experienced conflict which did not recur was 162.23 (using square root transformed data). There was a moderate positive correlation between higher population and civil war recurrence [r= .341, n= 238, p= .000*]. This finding supports the hypothesis that countries with a higher population will be more likely to experience recurring civil war.

HYPOTHESIS 16: *Countries which have lower population density will be more likely to experience recurring civil war.*

HYPOTHESIS 17: *High rural population figures will make civil war recurrence more likely.*

Collier and Hoeffler (2001, p 5) have found that both population density and urbanisation tend to be lower in countries which experience civil war. Collier and Hoeffler

suggest that these factors inhibit government capability. It makes sense that a dispersed rural population would be more difficult to control than a concentrated city state. For this reason, it is suggested that when civil war breaks out in countries which exhibit these characteristics, conflict recurrence will be more likely.

Data pertaining to these variables was also collected from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations 2006b). The population density was recorded as the number of people per square kilometre (the square root of this figure was taken) and the distribution of the population was recorded as the percentage of the population which lived in a rural area.

In countries where conflicts recurred, the mean population density was 8.61 people/km^2 while in countries where conflicts did not recur the mean population density was significantly lower at 6.61 people/km^2 (using square root transformed data). The Spearman Rank Order Correlation showed a small positive correlation between population density and conflict recurrence [r= .215, n= 238, p= .000*]. This finding shows the opposite of what was predicted, with population density higher in states which experienced recurring civil war. It was expected that a more dispersed population would be more difficult for a government to control and hence increase a country's susceptibility to subsequent conflict. Bearing this in mind it is difficult to explain the observed results, however, it is important to note that there is a very low population density in both recurring and non-recurring conflict cases given that the square root of the mean population density for all countries in the time period of this study is 29.3 people/km^2 (United Nations 2006b).

There is very little difference between the rural/urban distributions of the population in countries which experienced recurring as opposed to non-recurring civil war. In both cases there is a relatively high rural population, comprising 67% and 65% of the population in recurring and non-recurring conflicts respectively. There is no correlation to speak of between the population distribution and conflict recurrence [r= .043, n= 238, p= .510]. Hence, this finding also contradicts the original hypothesis that countries with larger rural populations will

be more susceptible to conflict recurrence. However, it is again important to note that the fraction of the population living in a rural area in countries which experienced both recurring and non-recurring civil war is higher than the mean rural population figure in all countries for the period of this study which is 61%. Hence, while this variable does not provide any information regarding the causes of civil war recurrence, it does indicate that civil war occurrence in general is associated with larger rural populations.

Third Party Characteristics: the Intervention of Third Parties during the Course of the Initial Conflict

The final set of variables considered at the antecedent level of analysis is the involvement of a third party during the course of the conflict. The involvement of another state is likely to have a significant influence on the complexion of a conflict. Given that a major component of this research is to determine how the nature of a conflict influences the likelihood of its recurrence, an intervention by a third party is an important issue to consider. Most research which considers the nature of third party interventions tends to focus on the involvement of mediators and negotiators in the post-conflict environment (Bercovitch, 2003; Regan and Rodwan, 2002; Rauchhaus, 2006). To my knowledge this is the first study which considers the effect of third party involvement (during hostilities) on civil war recurrence.

HYPOTHESIS 18: *The intervention of a third party during a conflict will reduce the probability conflict recurrence.*

HYPOTHESIS 19: *The extent to which a third party will reduce the likelihood of a conflict recurring is dependent on their power.*

It is hypothesised that the presence of a third party involved in the actual hostilities of a civil war will have a similar effect to what Walter (1997) describes as a security guarantee. By supporting one side in a conflict, a third party is displaying a strong interest in the conflict

being resolved in a particular way, hence sending a message to the opposition that they are willing to invest heavily to ensure a certain outcome is achieved. If a third party successfully intervenes in a civil war it is likely that they will want to protect their investment and ensure that the status quo that they have established remains, in doing this the third party will deter future aggression from the opposition. However, a third party's ability to generate this effect will be dependent on having a sufficient level of power so as to produce a credible level of deterrence. Data concerning the involvement of third parties in conflicts was taken from the PRIO/CSCW Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

When looking at conflicts which recurred, five (6%) involved a third party. Of the conflicts which did not recur, 18 (11.6%) involved a third party. There was only a very weak negative correlation between third party involvement and civil war recurrence [r= .090, n= 238, p= .166]. Hence the hypothesis that the involvement of a third party will reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence is not supported. Due in a large part to the small proportion of conflicts which involved a third party, there is no discernable trend in the relationship between the power of the third party involved in the conflict and whether or not the conflict recurs (see Appendix C).

In the five civil wars which involved external intervention and recurred, the third party sided with the opposition on one occasion, with the government on two occasions and in the remaining two cases there was third party involvement on both sides. In the 18 civil wars which involved external intervention and did not recur, two cases involved third party involvement on both the government and opposition side. Of the remaining 16 cases, the third party was involved eight times on either side. This shows that there is no tendency for third parties to take a particular side when intervening in civil wars.

Current Conditions: Conflict Cessation and the Nature of the Post-Conflict Environment

The previous factors which were examined involved variables at the antecedent level of analysis. The framework of analysis used in this research argues that civil war recurrence is contingent on both antecedent and current factors. Current conditions include the post-conflict environment along with the manner in which the civil war ended. Walter (2004) has considered the post-conflict environment in detail and found that a low post-conflict quality of life and barriers to political participation were correlated with civil war recurrence. Given that Walter (2004) has already considered the nature of post-conflict living conditions, this research will not consider quality of life variables. Three variables will be considered at the current level of analysis: the nature of any military victory, the means by which a civil war ends, and the nature of any United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. The relationship between post-conflict political systems and civil war recurrence has already been considered, with evidence supporting the hypothesis that "mid-range" post-conflict regime types will be most susceptible to civil war recurrence.

HYPOTHESIS 20: *Conflicts which end as a result of a decisive military victory will be less likely to recur*.

HYPOTHESIS 21: *The means by which a conflict ends will influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence.*

Hypotheses 20 and 21 were tested to determine how the way in which a conflict ends influences the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Walter (2004) has found that conflicts which end in a decisive victory are less likely to recur as a result of the victorious party gaining full control of the state allowing them to consolidate their power and deter future challenges. It is expected that the findings of this research will match those of Walter's with conflicts that end in a decisive military victory being considerably less likely to recur. However, in the dataset used in this research, only 43% of conflicts ended by way of a military victory meaning that it

was also necessary to investigate the relationship between conflict recurrence and other forms of conflict cessation.

Information regarding how conflicts ended was collected from the PRIO/CSCW Conflict Termination Dataset (forthcoming). This project grouped conflict terminations into six different categories. First, peace agreements, which are defined as an agreement which regulates or solves the central part of a conflict which is signed or accepted by all the major parties involved in the conflict. Secondly, ceasefires with conflict regulation which are signed or accepted by all the major parties involved in the conflict. The third means of cessation is a ceasefire which includes an agreement amongst the major parities involved in the conflict to stop military action but does not include conflict regulation. A fourth conflict outcome is military victory where one side active in the last year of conflict is either defeated or succumbs to the power of the other through capitulation or public announcement. The fifth potential outcome occurs as a result of either low or no activity where the level of intensity or organisation does not meet the criteria set out in the definition of a civil conflict. A final category of conflict termination is also includes any other theoretically possible conflict outcome.

Of 83 conflicts which recurred, just seven (8.4%) ended as a result of a military victory. Of the seven conflicts which ended in military victory, the government was victorious on all but one occasion. Contrastingly, of 155 civil conflicts which did not recur, 96 (61.9%) ended by way of military victory. Of these victories 66 (68.75%) were won by the government of the state in question. A strong negative correlation was found between the presence of a military victory and conflict recurrence [r= -.515, n= 238, p= .000**]. This result supports Walter's (2004) findings and the hypothesis that conflicts which end as a result of military victory are less likely to recur.

Having established that the presence or absence of a military victory is clearly an influential factor in determining conflict recurrence, the next step is to consider other ways in which conflicts were terminated. The following Tables (4.4 and 4.5) show a clear tendency for

conflicts which recur to end as a result of low activity or stalemate, while conflicts which do not recur tend to end as a result of one side achieving military victory.

Table 4.4: Nature of Cessation in Recurring Conflicts

Means of Resolution	Number of Cases	% of Total
Peace Agreement	6	7.2
Ceasefire with Conflict Regulation	6	7.2
Ceasefire	3	3.6
Victory	7	8.4
Low/No Activity	57	68.8
Other	4	4.8

Table 4.5: Nature of Cessation in Non-Recurring Conflicts

Means of Resolution	Number of Cases	% of Total
Peace Agreement	22	14.2
Ceasefire with Conflict Regulation	3	1.9
Ceasefire	2	1.3
Victory	96	61.9
Low/No Activity	30	19.4
Other	2	1.3

Table 4.6 shows the full results of Spearman's Rank Order Correlations for all possible modes of conflict cessation including military victory. Two strong correlations were revealed, both of which were significant at the 0.01 level. Conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity were positively correlated with civil war recurrence while conflicts which ended by way of a military victory were negatively correlated with conflict recurrence. A weaker

positive correlation, significant at the 0.05 level, was found between 'ceasefires with conflict regulation' and conflict recurrence. Surprisingly, the same correlation was not present between 'ceasefires without conflict regulation' and civil war recurrence.

Table 4.6: Spearman's Rank Order Correlation, Type of Cessation and Conflict Recurrence

	Peace Agreement	Ceasefire + Conflict Regulation	Ceasefire – Conflict Regulation	Victory	Low/No Activity	Other
Correlation Coefficient	-.103	.132*	.077	-.515**	.488**	.107
Sig. (2-tailed)	.113	.041	.235	.000	.000	.099
N	238	238	238	238	238	238

HYPOTHESIS 22: *UN peacekeeping will reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence.*

UN peacekeeping missions have experienced varying levels of success, however the weight of available literature suggests that their overall influence is a positive one. Data concerning the involvement of UN peacekeeping forces in civil wars was recorded from the UN web page and was measured according to the duration of the mission in months (United Nations 2006a). Only two cases of UN peacekeeping took place in conflicts which recurred, generating an average of 1.5 months of peacekeeping. There were 15 cases of UN peacekeeping in conflicts which did not recur, generating a mean of 5 months. This indicates that the presence of UN peacekeeping does reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence, however, Spearman's Rank Order Correlation revealed only a very weak negative correlation between the duration of UN peacekeeping missions and conflict recurrence [r= -.063, n= 238, p= .334]. Although this result produces only a very weak correlation, it does indicate that UN peacekeeping has a positive impact on post-conflict peace building. It is important to remember that at this stage, only 17 UN peacekeeping operations have taken place in response

to civil wars. As the number of UN missions increases, hopefully the trend established in this research will become more pronounced.

Summary

Based on the previous analysis, major changes can be made to the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence. Figure 4.2 shows the variables which had a significant influence on civil war recurrence when tested in the previous analysis.

Figure 4.2: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (Based on Bi-Variant Analysis)



Factors Relating to the Original Conflict

One variable in this category was found to have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of civil war recurrence: the incompatibility causing the conflict. Conflicts which recurred tended to arise over territorial issues while those which did not recur tended to arise as a result of challenges for the control of government.

Geography of the Conflict

The total land area of countries which experienced recurring civil war was higher than in countries which experienced non-recurring civil war. While the mean radius of conflicts was similar for both recurring and non-recurring conflicts, the radius as a percentage of the total land area did reveal a significant result. Conflicts which recurred were generally fought over a smaller portion of the state's territory than conflicts which did not recur. The other significant geographical factor was the proximity of the conflict to the nearest major city or the state's capital city. Conflicts which recur tend to be fought further away from major cities while those which do not recur were generally fought closer to major cities.

Ethno-Political Factors

Several significant correlations were found when considering factors specific to the state in which the civil war took place. Conflicts which took place in states where there was a higher level of ethnic diversity (as measured by the scale of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) were more likely to recur. The total population in countries which experienced recurring civil conflict was considerably higher than countries which experienced isolated conflicts. Surprisingly, countries which experienced recurring civil war were also more likely to have a higher population density than countries which experienced isolated conflict.

Third Party Involvement

No statistically significant results were found pertaining to the involvement of a third party *during* the conflict.

Current Conditions

The most important current factor influencing civil war recurrence is the means by which the conflict ends. The majority of conflicts which recurred ended as a result of low or no activity while conflicts which did not recur generally ended by way of a military victory. Conflicts which ended by way of a ceasefire with conflict regulation were also correlated with conflict recurrence. The nature of the post-conflict regime was also significant with mid-range regimes (neither highly democratic or highly autocratic) significantly more likely to experience recurring civil war.

Chapter Five

Multi-Variant Analysis and Discussion

Introduction

The initial findings discussed in the previous chapter only represent those based on descriptive information and bi-variant analysis. Bi-variant analysis assumes that the only factor influencing the dependent variable is the one independent variable which is being tested. Hence it is necessary to undertake more advanced analysis to gain a more accurate picture of the variables which contribute to the problem of civil war recurrence. As it has been mentioned, it is beyond the scope of this research to consider every conceivable factor which might influence civil war recurrence. Instead, the same variables which were analysed individually in the previous chapter will be grouped together and tested in clusters so as to achieve a more realistic idea of which factors are most strongly associated with civil war recurrence. Variables were grouped according to the categories shown in the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence then tested using Binary Logistic Regressions. The most significant results from each cluster ($t = >0.05$) were then tested again as a separate set of variables to give the closest possible indication of which variables influence conflict recurrence.

Multi-Variant Analysis

Conflict Characteristics

When the variables in this category were considered individually, the only significant finding was that conflicts which arose over territorial issues were more likely to recur while

those arising over competing claims for the control of government were less likely to recur. When the variables pertaining to the nature of the original conflict were considered together, the incompatibility causing the conflict remained the only significant result. Conflicts arising over territorial issues were positively associated with conflict recurrence while conflicts arising over competing claims for governmental control were negatively correlated with conflict recurrence. The model complied with goodness of fit tests (Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this analysis were responsible for between 14.2% and 19.5% of the variance in the independent variable (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.142, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.195).

Table 5.1: Logistic Regression: Conflict Characteristics

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Significance	Exp(B)
Territory**	1.550	.302	26.369	1	.000	4.712
Government**	-1.550	.302	26.369	1	.000	.212
Duration	-.002	.028	.007	1	.932	.998
Number of Factions	.235	.177	1.760	1	.185	1.265
Total Fatalities	.001	.004	.079	1	.779	1.001
Intensity	-.012	.008	2.511	1	.113	.988

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

Geographic Characteristics

When tested individually, three variables had a significant influence on civil war recurrence: total land area, the radius of the conflict relative to the size of the country and the proximity of the conflict to the nearest major city. When tested together, two significant results were revealed from this group of variables. First, a positive relationship, significant at the 0.01 level, was revealed between conflict recurrence and the distance from the centre of the conflict to the nearest major city. As the distance from the nearest major city increases, the likelihood of civil war recurrence increases. Secondly, the radius of the conflict relative to the land area of

the country was significant at the 0.05 level. This correlation was negative indicating that as the area of the conflict relative to the total land area of the country increases, the likelihood of civil war recurrence decreases. The model complied with goodness of fit tests (Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this analysis were responsible for between 13.5% and 18.6% of the variance in the independent variable (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.135, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.186).

Table 5.2: Logistic Regression: Geographic Characteristics

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Significance	Exp(B)
Total Land Area	.000	.000	1.060	1	.303	1.000
Radius % Land*	-2.893	1.330	4.734	1	.030	.055
Conflict Radius	-.002	.027	.006	1	.939	.998
Distance to Border	-.033	.023	2.108	1	.147	.967
Distance to Major City**	.056	.014	16.493	1	.000	1.058

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

Ethno-Political Characteristics

Using Binary Logistic Regression to analyse ethno-political factors showed that high ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) scores are positively correlated with civil war recurrence and significant at the 0.01 level. A positive correlation between population density and conflict recurrence was also revealed and significant to the 0.05 level. While not significant below 0.05, this model also shows a noteworthy correlation between increased total population and conflict recurrence. The model (see table 5.3) complied with goodness of fit tests (Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients and Hosmer Lemeshow Test). The variables in this analysis were responsible for between 15.7% and 21.5% of the variance in the independent variable (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.157, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.215).

Table 5.3: Logistic Regression: Ethno-Political Characteristics

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Significance	Exp(B)
% Population Rural	-.011	.008	1.763	1	.184	.989
ELF Index**	2.246	.829	7.343	1	.007	9.451
Total Population	.001	.001	2.977	1	.084	1.001
Population Density*	.100	.049	4.233	1	.040	1.105
Pre-Conflict Polity Score	-.015	.032	.226	1	.634	.985
Post-Conflict Polity Score	-.017	.036	.219	1	.640	.983
Polity Change	-.016	.030	.263	1	.608	.985

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

Current Conditions

The 'current conditions' variables had the greatest explanatory power in elucidating the reasons for civil war recurrence accounting for between 31.5% and 43.4% of variation (Cox & Snell R Square = 0.315, Nagelkerke R Square = 0.434). Three relationships were found which were significant below the 0.01 level (see table 5.4). Conflicts which ended with a peace agreement and those which ended as a result of military victory were negatively correlated with conflict recurrence, while conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity were significantly more likely to recur.

Table 5.4: Logistic Regression: Current Conditions

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Significance	Exp(B)
UN Peacekeeping (months)	-.003	.006	.266	1	.606	.997
Peace Agreement**	-1.910	.516	13.709	1	.000	.148
Ceasefire with CR	.040	.743	.003	1	.957	1.041
Ceasefire without CR	-.260	.942	.076	1	.782	.771
Victory**	-3.279	.454	52.246	1	.000	.038
Low/No Activity**	1.910	.516	13.709	1	.000	6.755
Other	.110	.904	.015	1	.903	1.116

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

Analysis Considering Significant Variables

Based on the preceding multi-variant analysis nine factors were found to have some significance (t = >0.05). These variables were then grouped together and analysed using Binary Logistic Regression.

Table 5.5: Logistic Regression: Significant Variables

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Significance	Exp(B)
Government	-.759	.451	2.834	1	.092	.468
Territory	.759	.451	2.834	1	.092	.468
Radius % Land Area	.024	1.537	.000	1	.987	1.024
Distance to Major City	.000	.000	.376	1	.540	1.000
ELF*	2.012	.972	4.286	1	.038	7.481
Population Density	.002	.002	.815	1	.367	1.002
Low/No Activity	-.036	.639	.003	1	.955	.964
Military Victory**	2.660	.716	13.801	1	.000	14.292
Peace Agreement	1.430	.781	3.351	1	.067	4.180

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

As shown in table 5.5, two variables were found to be statistically significant in determining whether or not a conflict will recur. The presence of a military victory was found to be highly significant (t=.000) while the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation was significant below the 0.05 level (t=.038). The incompatibility causing the conflict was also of noteworthy significance (t=>0.1), with conflicts arising over territorial issues more likely to recur while conflicts arising over competition for the control of government were less likely to recur.

Interestingly, the results of this model changed significantly when the peace agreement variable was excluded from the analysis. The most noteworthy difference was that a significant positive correlation emerges between conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity and conflict recurrence.

Table 5.6: Logistic Regression: Significant Variables (Peace Agreement Excluded)

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Significance	Exp(B)
Government*	-.918	.441	4.339	1	.037	.399
Territory*	.918	.441	4.339	1	.037	.399
Radius % Land Area	-.314	1.646	.036	1	.849	.730
Distance to Major City	.000	.000	1.087	1	.297	1.000
ELF*	1.945	.951	4.179	1	.041	6.994
Population Density	.002	.002	1.422	1	.233	1.002
Low/No Activity*	.867	.442	3.855	1	.050	2.380
Military Victory**	-1.827	.544	11.287	1	.001	.161

*Significant below 0.05, **Significant below 0.01.

From this revised model, five significant relationships are revealed. High ELF, territorial conflicts and conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity all have a positive relationship with civil war recurrence and were significant at the 0.05 level. Conflicts ending as a result of military victory and those arising over the issue of governmental control were both negatively associated with civil war recurrence at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. These variables are shown in a revised version of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (Figure 5.1) which illustrates the conditions under which a conflict is most likely to recur.

Figure 5.1: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence



Discussion

The remainder of this chapter will summarise the results and ramifications of both the single variable and multi-variant analysis. The results are divided between those which were of very little or no significance, those which exhibited some relevance, and those which were statistically significant. The four variables which were found to have a statistically significant influence on civil war recurrence are discussed in greater detail considering two important issues. First, potential explanations for the observed correlation are discussed. Secondly, the findings are discussed with reference to the improvement of civil war management and the goal of preventing civil war recurrence. The findings from this discussion will be summarised in the final chapter where a number of policy recommendations will be introduced which pertain to civil war management and the prevention of civil war recurrence.

Insignificant Results

Before considering the ramifications of the significant findings, it is important to consider the variables which did not significantly influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Seven variables failed to have a noteworthy influence on civil war recurrence at any stage of the analysis: the number of factions involved in the conflict, the radius of the conflict, the proximity of the conflict to the nearest international border, the country's pre-conflict regime type, regime stability, the involvement of a third party in the conflict and the proportion of the population living in a rural environment.

While these variables did not significantly influence whether or not a conflict recurred, they did reveal and reinforce some relevant ideas regarding civil wars in general. Discussion considering why these variables did not have the predicted influence on civil war recurrence is contained in the previous chapter.

Intermediary Results

There are a number of variables which were not significant when tested using multi-variant analysis but were significant when tested independently. These variables are classified as "intermediary" as, although they were not statistically significant, they also cannot be definitively discounted as variables which might help to predict civil war recurrence. This category includes the duration of the conflict, total fatalities, conflict intensity, conflict episode, total population, population density, UN involvement, post-conflict regime type, distance of the conflict to the nearest major city, and the radius of the conflict relative to the size of the country.

Significant Results

Four variables were found to be significantly correlated with civil war recurrence when tested individually as well as when tested using multi-variant analysis. Most noteworthy were the means by which conflicts ended. Conflicts which ended as a result of a decisive military victory showed a strong negative correlation with civil war recurrence (significant at the 0.01 level). This finding concurs with that of Walter's (2004) and the notion that the victorious party in a conflict will be able to take control of the mechanisms of government and consolidate their power and hence deter future challenges.

Conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity were positively correlated with civil war recurrence. Where one party invests in a conflict, yet fails to establish a decisive domination over the other, it is logical that a re-initiation of hostilities is likely. The source of the conflict was also a statistically significant variable. Conflicts arising over territorial issues were positively correlated with civil war recurrence while conflicts arising over competition for the control of government were negatively correlated with recurrence. High ELF scores were also positively correlated with civil war recurrence, meaning that civil wars which take place in countries with greater ethnic diversity are more susceptible to recurrence.

Finding 1: Civil Wars which End by way of a Decisive Military Victory are less likely to Recur

"If there's a problem we solve it we don't resolve it, it usually just evolves into one big brawl and we all get involved in it" (Eminem, 2006).

Multi-variant analysis clearly shows that conflicts which end as a result of a military victory are less likely to recur. It is logical that where one party has achieved sufficient advantage over their opponents to defeat them militarily the defeated party will lack the strength and motivation necessary to re-group and re-initiate hostilities within a ten year period. In addition, the victorious party in a conflict will often gain control of the country in question, enabling them to further consolidate their advantage over the opposition and deter future attack (Walter 2004, p 374). While theoretically logical, this finding is problematic as it implies that a good way to ensure that a conflict does not recur is for one party to simply annihilate its enemies. Are attempts to resolve civil conflicts peacefully simply an ineffectual waste of time? Would the international community be better served heeding the advice of rapper Eminem and solve conflicts by way of brute force rather than attempting to resolve them peacefully and running the risk of conflict escalation and prolongation?

At first glance, such a proposition seems outrageous. However, given the severity of some civil wars it could be argued that the international community should throw its support behind one party in a civil war, ensuring that the conflict comes to a rapid conclusion and that order is re-established in that country. This process has been used to deal with international conflict and achieved a measure of success in dealing with Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990. In this case, a large international force led by the United States and backed by the United Nations combined to effectively and efficiently expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Kahn, 1990). Could a similar process work in civil wars with external forces assisting one side

in the conflict and helping to bring that conflict to a rapid conclusion? While this process would involve considerable bloodshed before the conflict ended, at least it could be trusted to bring a more rapid and permanent end to the conflict.

Such a process would, however, generate far more problems than it would solve. The obvious problem being that the adoption of this method of conflict management would take place at the expense of more peaceful, albeit potentially less reliable, conflict management strategies. A second problem is that there would be massive difficulty in deciding which party to support in a civil conflict. In the international example of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the decision of the international community to oppose Iraq was a relatively straightforward one. It was the first case of one UN member state terminating the sovereignty of another UN member by force, meaning that Iraq had undeniably breached international law (Kahn 1993, p 427). Contrastingly, in most civil wars, wrong and right are generally much more difficult to distinguish. For example, when considering civil wars in Myanmar; would the international community support an ethnic group fighting for territorial independence or a highly autocratic military dictatorship? Furthermore, this approach to conflict management has the potential for Cold War-style confrontations to emerge where various countries support one party in a conflict while other countries lend support to opposing factions. Such a situation would most likely increase the intensity of a conflict rather than leading to a rapid conclusion. A final problem with the use of third parties to forcefully resolve conflicts is that superior military strength does not necessarily equate to a rapid military victory as was the case in the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Vietnam Civil War and the Afghan Civil War are both conflicts where a major power, USA and the Soviet Union respectively, has intervened and added considerable strength to one side in a conflict. In spite of the interventions by major powers, both civil wars could not be brought to a rapid or comprehensive conclusion; in reality both escalated.

Along with the obvious ethical issues associated with pursuing a violent means of conflict resolution, there are also practical issues which make it a potentially disastrous option for conflict management. Therefore, it is clear that the option of encouraging sides to fight to the death is a poor one. However, the findings from this research indicate that when a conflict does not end as a result of a military victory, the conflict is likely to re-emerge at a later date. Hence the international community is faced with a concerning dilemma; the peaceful resolution of conflicts and civil war non-recurrence appear to be mutually exclusive goals.

In order to alleviate this paradox, greater investment is required in peace building and negotiation efforts. Increased investment in peace building will improve its success rate and increase the likelihood of genuine conflict resolution, rather than peace building being a mere hiatus between conflict episodes. At this stage peace building efforts have only had a moderate level of success. The parties engaged in civil war will enter formal negotiations in approximately 50% of all civil wars, however less than 20% of civil conflicts are ended by way of a successful negotiated settlement (Wood 2003, p 247-248). Of the conflicts included in this analysis, 7.2% of the conflicts which recurred ended by way of a negotiated settlement. Hence, peace agreements are relatively uncommon in civil war and not necessarily a stable form of resolution.

Existing research considering why peace agreements are so difficult to implement has revealed several factors which need to be addressed in order to improve future peace building efforts. One of the key difficulties in resolving civil wars is that in accepting a peace agreement, competing factions must relinquish important fall-back defences at a time when there is no established legitimate government or neutral police to enforce the peace (Walter 1997, p 337). It is this vulnerability which makes the seemingly horrific prospect of continued fighting more appealing than attempting to negotiate a settlement. The most successful response to this problem is the provision of a “security guarantee” by a third party. In an empirical analysis of the factors which affect the durability of civil war settlements, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild

(2001) have found that settlements are much more successful when they include provisions for third party enforcement. Third party enforcement provides a guarantee that a third party will intervene to ensure the safety of the combatants should such a move be necessary. This reduces the vulnerability of the combatants in the post-conflict environment making co-operation and relinquishment of arms considerably easier.

Along with the importance of third party guarantors, researchers considering the success of negotiated settlements have also illustrated the importance of including provisions for power sharing in any negotiated civil war settlements (de Soto & del Costillo, 1995; Licklider, 1995; Hampson, 1996; Stedman & Rothchild, 1996). The implementation of multifaceted power sharing institutions will ensure that the former combatants all have a vested interest in maintaining peace meaning that the peace agreement becomes "self-enforcing" (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003, p 304).

While the benefits of power sharing institutions and third party guarantors are relatively clear, the quantity of academic research considering the success and failure of negotiated peace settlements remains relatively sparse. It is important for this body of literature to be expanded so that policy makers can draft clearer guidelines as to the determinant factors in the success of negotiated settlements. Until the success rate of negotiated settlements can be improved, policy makers will have a difficult task in convincing combatants to lay down their weapons and enter negotiations.

In spite of the difficulties associated with maintaining lasting civil war settlements, third party guarantors, power sharing provisions, and continued research will ensure that negotiated settlements become a better option, not only for policy makers but also for the combatants themselves.

Finding 2: Conflicts which End as a Result of Low or No Activity are more likely to Recur

While conflicts which ended as a result of a military victory were less likely to recur, the opposite proved to be the case when considering conflicts which ended by way of low or no activity; these conflicts were strongly correlated with civil war recurrence. It would appear that when conflicts reach a stage where there is minimal or no activity, on too many occasions the conflict is left to simmer and in many cases will restart at a later date. Of 87 conflicts which ended as a result of low or no activity, just 30 (34%) remained inactive for at least ten years with the remaining 57 (66%) recurring.

When a conflict reaches a stage where there is low or no activity it would appear to be the ideal time for a peace process to begin. Why is it then, that when there is a break in hostilities such a small percentage of warring countries are able to make more significant progress toward genuine resolution? Is it a case of third parties being unable to bring the conflicting sides together even during a lull in the hostilities, or is it assumed that once a conflict has dropped in intensity it is no longer a priority and hence interested third parties are better off concentrating their resources in other areas?

First, it is important to note that conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity tend to have a lower intensity than other conflicts; conflicts which ended in low or no activity had a mean intensity of 27.8 while all other conflicts had a notably higher mean intensity of 44.8 (using square root data). Hence, it is plausible that interested third parties might make the assumption that these conflicts are a low priority that have wound down to a natural conclusion and hence are not in need of intensive conflict management. However, the sheer number of conflicts which end as a result of no or low activity and subsequently recur proves that this is clearly not the case.

Rather than leaving these conflicts to stagnate (and in most cases eventually re-ignite), surely a better approach would be to take advantage of the lull in hostilities and try to build a more co-operative relationship between the competing factions. As mentioned earlier, an initial

consideration would suggest that conflicts with low or no hostilities would be ideally suited to the initiation of some form of peace building process. Peace building efforts would not be hampered by direct fighting and the lack of trust generated by the conflict would be less severe at this time. In a sense, half the battle has already been won, the cause of the conflict might not have been resolved but at least the factions are no longer engaged in open combat.

The discussion regarding the previous finding (pages 91 – 94), argued that while peace agreements are not necessarily the most stable form of conflict resolution, they remain the most promising alternative to ongoing civil war. This argument is supported by Sambanis and Doyle (2000, p 785) who found that where some form of agreement or treaty was signed, peace building was more likely to succeed, not necessarily because the combatants were bound by the agreement, but because such an action showed that both parties had some motivation to move toward resolution. While not as conclusive as other findings, this research also indicated that conflicts which ended in a peace agreement are less likely to recur. 28 conflicts in the dataset ended with a peace agreement with just six (21%) of these conflicts recurring while the other 22 (79%) remained inactive. Bearing this in mind, surely a period of low or no activity should not be seen by interested parties as the end of a conflict but rather as an opportunity to begin a peace building process and to ensure that the cessation in hostilities remains permanent.

Interestingly, this is not necessarily the case. It has been argued that the ideal time to initiate peace talks is when the parties involved in a conflict are struggling to achieve dominance over their opposition. Zartman (1989), Hass (1990) and Steadman (1991) have all focused on the notion of "ripeness". Rather than isolating a specific stage in the conflict, they argue that successful conflict mediation is dependent on the identification of a ripe moment in the course of a conflict. Zartman (1989) argues that the ripe moment to initiate mediation is when the parties have reached what he refers to as a "mutually hurting stalemate". A mutually hurting stalemate is characterised by a:

> "recent or impending catastrophe; the parties' unilateral solutions are blocked making bilateral solutions conceivable; and power relations have

> changed between the disputants in a way where the previously superior party begins to lose the upper hand and a rough power disparity emerges" (Zartman 2000, cited in Kleiboer, 1994, p 110).

Conversely, Haass (1990) considers a conflict to be ripe for resolution when four prerequisites are met: a shared perception of the desirability of compromise, the ability of political leaders to agree to a desirable accord, compromises involved in agreements or peace plans must be presented in such a way that leaders of both sides can convince their respective constituencies that the national interest has been protected, combatants must agree on an acceptable procedure to further deal with their conflict (Hass 1990, cited in Kleiboer 1994, p 110). Hence, both Haass and Zartman agree that disputants need to feel as if they would be considerably worse off if they were unable to reach a settlement of some description.

The ideas of both Zartman and Haass regarding ripeness suggest that for two key reasons, peace building efforts would not be most effective during a lull in hostilities. First, conflicts characterised by low or no hostilities clearly do not meet Zartman's idea of an imminent catastrophe; in fact, it is likely that a lull in hostilities would represent the best conditions in the country for some time and hence the combatants might want to avoid anything which could threaten the stability of the status quo. Secondly, it would be difficult for leaders to convince their respective constituencies (who have already invested heavily in the conflict) that compromise was necessary at this stage given that the immediate threat would be relatively low.

While a lull in hostilities may not fit the model of a conflict which is "ripe for resolution" it is clear that a break in hostilities does not represent a permanent end to a conflict. It is clear that further research into this dilemma is required so as to ensure that periods within a conflict where there are low or no fatalities become the status quo, rather than merely a lull in fighting.

Finding 3: Conflicts which are fought in Countries with Higher Levels of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation are more likely to Recur

Perhaps the most surprising finding from this research is that high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation are positively correlated with civil war recurrence. Based on the findings of consulted literature, the majority of which has found that ethnic diversity alone does not increase a country's susceptibility to civil war, it was originally hypothesised that this variable would not significantly influence civil war recurrence. Walter (2004) did not consider the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation in her study, however, she did take into account whether or not combatants were divided along ethnic lines. Walter found that wars fought between different ethnic groups were no more likely to recur than those involving participants from the same ethnic group.

Bearing in mind the assertion that ethnic diversity does not make a country any more prone to an initial outbreak of civil war, it is suggested that when conflict does rear its head in an ethnically diverse country, the ethnic complexity of the society alters the fabric of the conflict making it more susceptible to recurrence. This finding is in direct contradiction to the aforementioned findings of Walter (2004). However, Walter's research was undertaken using a vastly different set of data which was defined by a much higher fatalities threshold. As a result this divergence in findings is not overly surprising.

Bearing in mind that ethnic diversity was not a major factor that increases the risk of an outbreak of civil war, why is it that ethnically diverse countries are more likely to experience recurring civil war? Vanhanen (1999, p 55) suggests that the "universality of ethnic conflict can be explained by our evolved predisposition to ethnic nepotism, which can be regarded as an extended form of nepotism". Ethnic nepotism is defined simply as the tendency to favor kin over non-kin in terms of linguistic, national, racial, religious and other ethnic groups (Vanhanen 1999, p 57). Using this rationale, all ethnically diverse countries would be highly prone to civil war, yet, as it has already been mentioned, ethnic diversity alone has *not* been established as a factor which makes countries more susceptible to civil war. What has been

established is that regardless of the cause of civil wars, they are often organised along ethnic lines with ethnicity used as a propaganda tool to incite violence among those who were not previously enemies and to make the conflict appear to be the result of genuine grievances (Collier 2007, p 56; Sambanis 2001, p 263). As put by Collier (2007, p 56) "whether or not ethnic divisions are a cause of a conflict, they are likely to be a consequence of it". As a result, an antagonistic ethnic dimension is added to many conflicts meaning that following the conclusion of the conflict, societies are trapped within the ethnic categories that the conflict determined.

I argue that the ethnic division exacerbated during civil wars will generate a post-conflict security dilemma, which will in turn significantly increase the likelihood of civil war recurrence. This is of course dependent on sufficient ethnic diversity existing in the society prior to the conflict emerging (without this, it would be difficult to organize combatants along ethnic lines). The proposed process by which ethnic diversity increases the risk of civil war recurrence is shown in Figure 5.2 (see page 100). It should be noted that this theory is only a speculative explanation for the finding that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Further empirical analysis would be required to determine whether or not security dilemmas are the primary causal mechanism in the recurrence of civil wars in ethnically diverse states.

"Security dilemma" is a term which refers to the problem that emerges when one party (traditionally a state) inadvertently increases feelings of insecurity amongst other parties as a direct result of their attempts to improve their own security (Herz 1950, p 157). Although the term was originally used with reference to relations between states, in more recent years many scholars have applied the security dilemma concept to the different groups involved in civil wars (Collins 1998; Kaufmann 2007; Rose 2001). It is logical that an ethnic security dilemma might emerge within a state when one ethnic group attempts to increase their security and in doing so increases feelings of insecurity in other ethnic groups within that state.

Figure 5.2: Ethnic Diversity, Security Dilemmas, and Civil War Recurrence



All states have *some* level of ethnic diversity, however, because ethnic groups in most states will generally pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels, most states will not experience ethnic security dilemmas (Lake & Rothchild 1996, p 43). Ethnic security dilemmas come to the fore "when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict, and fear of what the future might bring" (Newland 1993, p 161, cited in Lake and Rothchild, 1996, p 43). Hence, the wake of a conflict where participants were divided along ethnic lines is an ideal environment in which an ethnic security dilemma might emerge. When the memories of a past conflict are fresh in the mind and physical security remains of paramount concern it is unsurprising that ethnic groups will

attempt to increase their security. In doing so, it may be tempting for opposing factions to match or exceed their opposite's power or to use force pre-emptively to ensure their security.

The revelation that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of civil war recurrence does not bode well with respect to peace building. Sambanis and Doyle (2000, pp 787-789) have found that ethnic and identity wars exhibit a significant negative correlation with peace building success. Ethnic conflicts are particularly intractable because ethnic identity is a very powerful association involving identity issues which are either difficult or impossible to change such as language, culture, religion, and parentage (Kaufmann 1996, p 138). Probably the most important implication of this finding is that policy makers concerned with the resolution of civil wars need to consider the ethnic dimensions of conflict very carefully and be aware that if conflict does break out in countries with a diverse society it is more likely to be complicated by additional problems at a later date, such as recurrence. It should also be remembered that although ethnic diversity has not been found to directly increase the likelihood of civil war outbreak, it still needs to be taken into consideration when addressing a conflict. If ethnic security dilemmas are a relevant factor in the re-emergence of civil wars one of the most important peace building tasks is to ensure that unbiased, objective information is made available to the relevant parties. This can help to increase the understanding of the positions of former enemies and prevent the build-up of false beliefs about opposing factions' intentions (Lake & Rothchild 1996, p 74).

Finding 4: Conflicts Arising over Territorial Issues are more likely to recur while Conflicts over Competition for the Control of Government are less likely to Recur

For two reasons it was hypothesised that territorial conflicts would be more likely to recur than those over competition for the control of government. First, it was suggested that identity issues (which have been proven to be much more difficult to resolve) are more likely

to be associated with territorial conflicts than governmental conflicts. Secondly, given that the victorious party in conflicts arising over competition for the control of government will generally take control of the state, it is likely that they will consolidate their dominance over their opposition and be unlikely to face challenges in the immediate future. Not only was this trend confirmed but it was revealed that territorial conflicts have a significant positive correlation with conflict recurrence while governmental conflicts are significantly negatively correlated with conflict recurrence. Disputed territorial issues were the root cause of 67.5% of conflicts which recurred while the remaining 32.5% of recurring conflicts were a result of competition to control government. When looking at conflicts which did not recur, the exact opposite proved to be the case. Competition for the control of government was the key incompatibility in 67.5% of these conflicts while territorial issues accounted for the remaining 32.5% of non-recurring conflicts. Hence, with respect to peace building, conflicts fought over control of the government are not particularly worrying as far as recurrence is concerned. Once the conflict has ended the primary concern is that the victors manage their newly established control of the state responsibly.

Clearly, conflicts which arise over territorial issues are more concerning with regard to their likelihood of recurrence. The most obvious response to this problem would be the partition of states so that some territorial autonomy is granted. The issue of partition is a difficult one as it involves striking a balance between maintaining the integrity of states and the right to self-determination (Carment & Rowlands, 2004, pp 366-367). There are a number of academics who see partition as a viable option, particularly when ethnicity is a key factor in the conflict. Downes (2004; 2006) has found that conflicts which end by way of some form of compromise, such as a negotiated settlement, are nearly three times more likely to recur than those which end by way of a military victory. Furthermore, Downes' (2006) findings show that of the negotiated settlements in civil wars that failed, every one occurred in a conflict in which ethnicity, as opposed to ideology, was the central line of cleavage. In the light of these findings, Downes (2006) suggests that the international community's growing belief in the use of

negotiated settlements to resolve ethnically based civil wars may be unjustified. Accordingly, instead of negotiated settlements, a new approach is required. Downes (2006) advocates for a third party to help bring the conflict to an end not by negotiating a settlement but by helping one party to achieve a military victory. Where the third party intervened on the side of ethnic rebels, the military victory will result in partition which should be made as ethnically homogenous as possible.

While initially appealing, this approach suffers from many of the problems presented earlier in this chapter: how will third parties decide which side to support, and what is stopping a fourth party from taking sides with another faction in the conflict leading to increased escalation? It should also be remembered that sheer weight of power will not ensure a rapid military victory in civil war. Given the guerrilla tactics which are prominent in many civil wars, a small number of lightly armed forces can potentially inflict significant damage to an opposition over a sustained period of time as was evident in the Sierra Leone conflict in the late 1990's (Reno 2001). Additionally, while successful peace agreements are much more difficult to secure and much rarer than military outcomes, it is surely a better goal to try to resolve conflicts peacefully than to use further violence and the potential annihilation of one faction as a means of resolution. For these reasons, it is argued that partition by way of force as suggested by Downes (2006) is not a desirable response to civil wars, identity based or otherwise.

While partition as part of a military victory is not a desirable form of conflict management, should peace agreements provide provisions for some form of partition? Kaufmann (1996; 1998) advocates for partition along ethnic lines as a conflict management strategy in ethnic civil wars where the threat of violence is particularly severe. Kaufmann (1996) cites four cases supporting this reasoning: Bosnia and Croatia, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and Palestine. In each of these cases, violence was greatly diminished following partition. Contrastingly, a subsequent study conducted by Mason and Fett (1996) finds that

ethnic conflicts are no more difficult to resolve by way of a peace agreement than other conflicts[1]. Hence, the feasibility of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars remains unclear.

This research differentiated between conflicts which ended by way of a peace agreement, ceasefire, ceasefire with conflict regulation, military victory, low or no activity and all other forms of resolution. No differentiation was made between peace agreements which included provisions for partition and those which did not. However, in a study of a similar nature, Walter (2004) considered whether or not partition helped to reduce a country's susceptibility to subsequent civil war. In contrast to Kaufmann's (1996) predictions it was found that partition showed a strong positive correlation with civil war recurrence. While partition may lead to lower levels of violence *between those parties which have been separated*, Walter (2004, p 379) suggests that further violence in the country is likely as "government concessions over territory in one case appear to encourage additional challengers to initiate their own demands". Given that the average country has between five and six ethnic groups which make up at least one percent of their country's total population[2] (Fearon, 2003), the potential for copycat conflicts is very high. Hence, as a general rule, partition cannot be considered as an effective means of conflict management. While it is effective in ending violence between the relevant parties it also increases the likelihood of future violence between different factions within the state.

Assuming that partition and ensuring a military victory by means of adding strength to one party in a civil war are not a suitable means of conflict management, how should identity based territorial civil wars be resolved? Harff and Gurr (2004, p 186) argue that the best way to handle ethnic conflicts is through negotiations for autonomy within existing states. This is supported by the findings of Kauffman (1996) and Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) who have found that peace agreements which involve some form of territorial autonomy are more likely to succeed than those which do not. This is most easily achieved in states with some

[1] For discussion regarding the divergent findings of Kauffman (1996) and Mason and Fett (1996) see Kuperman (2004, pp 343-346).
[2] For detailed discussion regarding the extent of ethnic diversity see Fearon (2003).

degree of democratic government because ethnic leaders can use the electoral process to gain influence in regional and national government. However, the mean Polity score for states which experience civil war is below zero indicating that most states which experience civil wars are generally non-democratic. This indicates that the peace building process may require not only a transition from fighting to peace, but also from autocracy to democracy and the difficulties of achieving the latter have also been well documented[1]. The gradual introduction of democracy would allow the opposition some inclusion in the decision making process of the state rather than being marginalised and repressed by the regime.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the problems associated with the implementation of civil war settlements are numerous. One of the primary difficulties in this period is convincing parties to move beyond the distrust created by a conflict and toward a self-enforcing peace. According to Hoddie and Hartzell (2003, p 305), the best way to achieve this is by parties involved in a negotiated settlement making their commitment to peace "apparent and credible to all by sending signals that have unavoidable costs attached to them". When parties have to sacrifice their own interests in pursuit of a peace settlement, their commitment to that settlement is likely to have much greater credibility and indicates a genuine commitment to the peace process. As mentioned earlier, the most effective commitment to the conciliatory process is the signing of a peace agreement which includes provisions for the mutual establishment of power-sharing and power-dividing institutions which divides state control amongst the former adversaries (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003, p 306). Another factor (which has also been discussed in greater detail earlier, see pages 93 – 94) which should be considered when attempting to initiate a peace agreement with power sharing is the benefit of third party security guarantees.

[1] See Diamond (1994)

Chapter Six

Conclusion: Application of Findings and Policy Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter begins by revisiting the primary objectives of the research and considering the extent to which they have been accomplished. Findings from the research will then be applied to two civil wars which have recently ended: the conflict between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge which ended in 1998 and the territorial conflict in the Aceh region between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia which ended in 2005 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). The purpose of this exercise is to show how the findings from this research can be applied to conflicts, both presently and in the future, to assess their risk of recurrence. Following this, the information gathered in this research will be used to present a number of recommendations on how conflicts can be managed so as to reduce their susceptibility to recurrence. The limitations of this research are identified and discussed with recommendations to overcome these limitations and suggestions for future research. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the findings from this research and discussion of the importance of continued civil war research.

Objectives Revisited

There were three primary objectives which this thesis aimed to address. The first was to develop a framework with which variables that might influence civil war recurrence could be tested. The second objective was to utilise this framework to isolate certain factors which are

correlated with civil war recurrence and then relate these findings to existing civil war research. The final objective was to analyse the most significant findings from this research and use this information to formulate post-conflict policy recommendations.

With regard to the first of these objectives, after multi-variant analysis, the original Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence was narrowed down to include just a handful of the most important factors which are correlated with civil war recurrence (see Figure 6.1). All of these variables were positively associated with civil war recurrence ($t=<0.05$) when tested using multi-variant binary logistic regression.

Figure 6.1: Revised Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence
(showing statistically significant variables)



How do these Findings Relate to Civil War Literature?

Most civil war research divides the incompatibility causing civil wars between whether or not the major causes involve identity issues such as ethnicity and religion. Several studies (Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001; Lake & Rothchild 1996; Sambanis & Doyle 2000) have shown that conflicts will be more difficult to resolve when they involve identity issues as it is

particularly difficult for combatants to compromise on these issues. This theory was supported by the findings of this research; territorial conflicts (which are deemed to be more likely to be tied to identity issues) are more likely to recur than conflicts which arose over competition for the control of government (which are less likely to involve identity issues).

The second major finding from this research is that conflicts which occur in countries which have a high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) are more likely to recur. Most studies which have investigated the causes of civil war have found that ethnic diversity alone is not correlated with the outbreak of civil war. For this reason it was initially anticipated that ethnic diversity would not have a significant influence on civil war recurrence. However, the results showed a significant positive correlation between high ELF scores and civil war recurrence. The most likely explanation for this deviation is that different causal mechanisms are at work between when a conflict initially emerges and when a conflict recurs. When conflict does materialise in a diverse society an ethnic dimension may emerge within the conflict which complicates post-conflict peace building and hence increases countries' susceptibility to civil war recurrence. This idea is supported by the findings of other research which found that ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with peace building success (Sambanis & Doyle 2000).

The remaining findings illustrated in Figure 6.1 show that conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity are likely to recur while conflicts which end as a result of military victory generally do not recur. These findings supported the hypotheses and matched those of other findings in studies of a similar nature (Licklider 1995). Rather than representing the beginning of a permanent end to hostilities, it appears that conflicts which 'end' as a result of low or no activity are merely in hibernation as opposing factions do not have the necessary resources or will to continue significant hostilities, but the issues driving the original conflict remain unresolved. Alternately, when conflicts are ended by way of a decisive military victory, the defeated party's morale and capability will often take a severe punishing while at the same

time the victorious party will usually gain control of the state and consolidate their power making the resumption of the same conflict in the immediate future very unlikely.

In addition to these factors, several other variables were also correlated with civil war recurrence, albeit not as strongly as the variables shown in Figure 6.1. Another ten variables showed a noteworthy relationship with civil war recurrence. These are added into the revised version of the Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence shown in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Inclusive Contingency Model of Conflict Recurrence (showing statistically significant variables and intermediate variables)



Application of Findings: Cambodia (Khmer Rouge) and Indonesia (Aceh)

Before concluding, the findings of this research will be applied to two different conflicts, both of which have ended during the past ten years. This will serve as an example of how the findings from this research might be used to assess the risk of recurrence in future conflicts or conflicts which have recently ended. The conflict between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge represents a good example of a conflict which, according to the findings in this research, *will not* recur.

With regard to the major findings from this research, Cambodia fares well with respect to three out of four important indicators. First, the conflict was one which arose over competing claims for the control of government, not a territorial one. This means that identity issues are less likely to be involved in the conflict making recurrence less likely. Secondly, the conflict ended in 1998 with the surrender of remaining Khmer Rouge leadership (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). Hence, the Government of Cambodia achieved a decisive victory which has been proven to be the most stable means by which conflicts end. Thirdly, in achieving military victory, the Government of Cambodia avoided allowing the conflict to stagnate and end as a result of low or no fatalities. The one major area of concern regarding the stability of peace in Cambodia is the country's high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Cambodia has an ELF score of 0.82 (Annett 2001, p 573) meaning it has high levels of diversity which was one variable which was strongly associated with civil war recurrence.

Many of the intermediary indicators revealed in this research also show that the Cambodian civil war is unlikely to recur. First, the conflict in Cambodia had over 20,000 fatalities during its 30 year history meaning that the conflict had a relatively high number of fatalities and level of intensity, both of which are negatively correlated with civil war recurrence. Secondly, during the 1990's Cambodia received considerable assistance from the United Nations by way of an 18 month United Nations operation (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) which involved a deployment of 15,991 military personnel and 3,359 civilian police at a cost of approximately 1.6 billion ($US). At the time, this was the most

expensive operation in the organisation's history (United Nations 2006c). Thirdly, distance between Phnom Penh and the conflict's epicentre was relatively low, Cambodia has a relatively small land area (181,040 km^2), and the battle zone had a comparatively high radius as a proportion of Cambodia's land area, all of which are factors that are negatively correlated with civil war recurrence. Hence, on the whole, the indications for Cambodia are very encouraging. Based on most of the important indicators revealed in this research, conflict between the Government and the Khmer Rouge is unlikely to re-emerge.

One conflict which has recently ended which, according to this research, *is likely* to recur, is the separatist conflict waged by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on the Indonesian Island of Sumatra. While the incompatibility had its roots as early as 1976, fatalities generated by the conflict did not reach 25 until 1990 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). In August 2005 the conflict was officially terminated with the signing of The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and GAM.

The Aceh Civil War does not fare well when analysed considering the four major findings from this research. First, the primary incompatibility causing the conflict was a territorial one. GAM claims that if the region were allowed to use all the revenue from operations in the province, it would be able to establish an independent Muslim sultanate like nearby Brunei Darussalam (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). Hence this was a territorial conflict and involved identity issues. The findings of this research have shown that territorial conflicts are much more susceptible to recurrence than ones that arise over competition for the control of government. Secondly, this conflict was ended by way of a negotiated peace agreement. The evidence regarding the stability of negotiated settlements in civil wars shows only a very weak correlation between conflicts which were terminated through the signing of a peace agreement and non-recurrence. This form of termination is definitely not as stable as a military victory although it is the most stable alternative and is definitely better than a conflict ending as a result of low or no fatalities. A third concern with regard to this conflict is that

Indonesia has a very high level of ethnic diversity, 0.79, (Annett 2001, p 573) which is also strongly correlated with civil war recurrence.

The Aceh Civil War also fares poorly when analysed in reference to the intermediary indicators revealed in this research. The conflict resulted in a low number of fatalities and intensity (around 500 per year), Indonesia has a large land area, and the central point of the conflict is a considerable distance from a major population centre, all of which are positively correlated with civil war recurrence. Additionally, there was no UN involvement in this conflict; however, the peace agreement which was signed in 2005 was negotiated with the help of a Finnish NGO called the Crisis Management Initiative (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2006). Overall however, most of the important predictor variables that were revealed in this research indicate that the Aceh conflict has a high risk of recurrence in the next ten years.

The Cambodian and Indonesian conflicts serve as good examples of how this research can be applied to analyse conflicts which have recently ended or current and future conflicts. However, the purpose of this research was not simply to provide a framework by which the risk of civil war recurrence could be evaluated, but also to use this information to improve post-conflict peace building so the risk of civil war recurrence can be reduced. The analysis of the significant findings from this research has revealed some interesting results in this regard.

Policy Recommendations

One of the major findings from this research is that conflicts which end as a result of military victory are less likely to recur while conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity are more likely to recur. The first policy implication which can be drawn from this finding is that a military victory should not necessarily be viewed as a bad thing. In some cases conflicts might be easily and rapidly concluded by way of a comprehensive show of force. While this method would involve some initial fatalities, it would ensure a rapid conclusion to the conflict and would deter other potential aggressors. Bearing this in mind, the analysis in the

previous chapter has revealed that in most cases it would be unwise for a third party to try to bring a conflict to a rapid conclusion by adding their strength to one side in a civil conflict.

The finding that conflicts which end in low or no activity are likely to recur presents policy makers with a conundrum. On one hand, the conventional wisdom regarding the timing of interventions suggests that they will be most successful when both parties feel that they would be considerably worse off if some form of agreement is not reached (Zartman 2000; Hass 1995). Based on this logic, a period of low or no fatalities would definitely not be the best time to intervene. On the other hand, this research shows that a significant proportion of conflicts which end as a result of low or no activity will recur. Hence, the decision must be made as to whether interventions take place when they are most likely to be successful (as outlined by Zartman and Hass) or when they are most necessary (when conflicts end as a result of low or no fatalities). Given the sheer number of conflicts which appear to have ended but then recur, it is the author's opinion that more effort must be made to initiate peace talks regardless of whether the conflict is considered "ripe" for resolution. Where conflicts have ended as a result of low or no fatalities and the combatants are no longer engaged in significant hostilities, policy makers should capitalise on the opportunity and ensure that the movement toward peace is maintained rather than leaving the conflict to stagnate and potentially recur.

The most interesting finding from this research was that ethno-linguistic fractionalisation was positively correlated with civil war recurrence, meaning that civil wars are more likely to recur in countries which have greater levels of ethnic diversity. The emergence of ethnic security dilemmas is presented as a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, however further research is required in this area as empirical analysis has not been conducted to test the validity of this theory. The major recommendation for policy makers which can be gained from this finding is simply that ethnic cleavages should not be overlooked in the post-conflict environment, even if ethnicity was not a key component of the initial outbreak of the conflict. If security dilemmas are a major factor contributing to the recurrence

of conflict in ethnically diverse societies, peace agreements which include provisions for power sharing and third party guarantors are likely to help overcome this problem.

The final major finding from this research is that conflicts which arise over territorial issues are positively correlated with recurrence while conflicts arising over competing claims for control of government are negatively correlated with recurrence. It is argued that partition is not a suitable peace building option as it may encourage additional conflicts from other separatist groups interested in succession. Instead, where territorial issues are severe, policy makers and other relevant actors should consider the option of promoting semi-autonomous regions within existing state borders.

Along with the aforementioned results, there were a number of other findings from this research which, while not statistically significant, will aid policy makers and other relevant actors when assessing the risk of civil war recurrence. Low intensity, large land area, high population, a small conflict radius relative to the size of the country and an isolated battle zone were all factors that are correlated with civil war recurrence. Conversely, UN involvement and conflicts ending by way of a peace agreement or a ceasefire with conflict regulation were both factors which are negatively correlated with civil war recurrence. Along with these factors, there were several variables which can be discounted in the sense that they have no or very minimal influence on civil war recurrence. Included in this category are the number of factions involved in the conflict, the regime type prior to the outbreak of conflict, the proximity of the battle zone to the nearest international border, the involvement of third parties and the percentage of the population living in rural areas. The combination of these findings will aid policy makers and other relevant actors when assessing the risk of civil war recurrence.

Ideally, the UN and other interested third parties would take an active interest in all civil wars and try to ensure that they are brought to a stable and peaceful resolution. However, history has shown that this is not the case; in many cases countries receive little or no outside help in bringing conflicts to an end. Hence, these findings provide a useful tool to assess which

conflicts have the highest risk of recurrence and are in greatest need of assistance to ensure that recurrence does not occur.

Limitations

As a whole, this research has achieved the objective of establishing factors which are correlated with civil war recurrence. However, there are limitations which should be kept in mind when considering the results of this research. First, the results which were obtained only pertain to the variables which were tested. There were important variables which might theoretically influence civil war recurrence which were not included in the analysis due to difficulties in obtaining reliable data. A good example of this is the extent to which third parties were involved in the post-conflict environment. It would seem logical to assume that where a third party takes an active interest in the resolution of a conflict, it would have some impact on the stability of any cessation in hostilities. Unfortunately, information relating to such a variable was not available and could not be collated and operationalised due to the large number of cases which are considered in this research. A future study which was either conducted on a larger scale or using a comparative case study approach with more detailed analysis of a smaller number of cases would overcome this problem.

Problems caused by a lack of reliable data will be dramatically reduced in future civil war research due to the availability of Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research Database (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2006). This database includes highly detailed analysis of all civil wars using the same definition of civil war as that used in this research. Unfortunately, this data is only backdated as far as 1989, and thus could not be utilised in this research.[1]

A second limitation of this research is that it only considers variables pertaining to the nature of the civil war and the immediate post-conflict environment (the post-conflict regime

[1] Given that this research only considers conflicts which ended prior to 1995, use of Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research Database would severely limit the size of the sample.

type, how the conflict was concluded, whether or not there was UN involvement, and whether a peace agreement was signed). This research could be expanded by including a consideration of variables associated with the living conditions in the years following the cessation of hostilities. This would enable the study to test Walter's (2004) hypothesis that the risk of conflict recurrence will be inversely proportional to the quality of post-conflict living conditions. The Polity variable which measures the regime type of the country prior to the conflict breaking out and in the period following the conflict was the only measure of how the post-conflict living conditions influence the likelihood of conflict recurrence. The inclusion of proxy variables measuring pre and post-conflict living conditions in the analysis would provide a more accurate depiction of how societal changes caused by the conflict would influence the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

This research is also limited in the sense that it only considered the problem of civil war recurrence where the second episode of the conflict was essentially the same as the first.[1] While this in itself is not a problem it does limit the usefulness of the research. This research has established a number of factors which will make a conflict more or less likely to recur, however it gives no indication of whether or not the characteristics of the conflict make the country in question susceptible to further conflict involving different factions with different objectives. Hence, using these findings it could be concluded that a particular conflict has a very low risk of recurrence when in reality the effects of the conflict might leave the country particularly susceptible to the emergence of another conflict involving different participants. This problem could be overcome by conducting this research using a similar methodology but with two definitions of civil war: the one used in this research along with another more general definition which simply includes any future conflict. This would facilitate a much clearer

[1] The rationale for using this approach is that where conflict is followed by another conflict within ten years, over 60% of the subsequent conflicts involve the same factions and incompatibilities as the preceding conflict. Therefore, the primary security concern facing countries in the wake of a civil war is that the same conflict does not recur.

indication of what causes a country to become a victim of the "conflict trap" and hence a clearer conception of how this problem can be avoided.

This research also suffers from the magnitude of the issue under consideration. Given the large number of cases and relevant variables, it was difficult to conduct the research with the detail that would have been preferable within the time restraints imposed upon this study. In order to produce a meaningful piece of research, it was necessary to isolate a very specific element of the broader post-civil war field. In this regard, this research has really only scraped the surface when it comes to determining how sustainable peace can be restored in post-conflict societies. What is needed in this field is a comprehensive study which combines the research conducted in this study with analysis of recurring civil war in general (not just recurrence of conflicts involving the same factions and incompatibilities) and other elements of post-conflict peace building including the role of third parties, negotiations and peace agreements, socio-economic development, political transition and democratisation, social reconciliation, and demobilisation.

The Importance of Continued Civil War Research

This research represents only a very small contribution to an increasingly sizeable body of literature concerning civil war. Given the significance of the problem caused by civil wars, it is important that research in this field remains one of the primary focuses in the Political Science discipline. A commonly used definition of the term "conflict" suggests that conflict arises from the "mutual recognition of competing or incompatible material interests and basic values and ... conflict is a pervasive feature of all social relations" (Dixon 1996, p 655). Given that conflict is "a pervasive feature of all social relations" the idea of attempting to eliminate conflict altogether is as noble as it is unrealistic. Instead we must focus on building mechanisms through which conflict can be managed in a non-violent manner. However, given the proclivity for conflicts to evolve into violent civil wars it is also necessary to be realistic and for contingency plans to be available in an effort to limit the adverse effects of civil wars

should they occur. This research aimed to achieve this by investigating why some conflicts which appear to have ended will recur several years later. In spite of the aforementioned limitations, this research has provided some interesting and useful findings regarding civil war recurrence.

At the start of this research, the introductory chapter discusses the disastrous consequences which civil wars continue to generate in many countries across the globe. In spite of the harm which civil war causes and the considerable academic and practical efforts aimed at resolving violent conflict, civil war remains one of major scourges facing humanity in the 21st century. As put by former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar;

> "Peace is, and has always been, the ultimate human aspiration ... yet our history overwhelmingly shows that while we speak incessantly of peace, our actions tell a very different story".

For this reason, it is crucial that the horrors of civil war are not endured on multiple occasions and the pattern of civil war recurrence is not allowed to continue.

Appendix A

Bercovitch's Contingency Framework



Source: Bercovitch and Wells (1993)

Appendix B

Conflicts Included in Analysis

Government/Location[1]	Primary Opposition Group	Recur?	Start	End	Fatalities
Angola, Cuba	UNITA , South Africa, FNLA , Zaire	Yes	1975	1995	143000
Angola	FLEC-R	Yes	1991	1991	125
Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R	Yes	1994	1994	125
Angola	FLEC-FAC	Yes	1996	1998	250
Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R	Yes	2002	2002	315
Argentina	Military faction	Yes	1955	1955	900
Burundi	Palipehutu	Yes	1991	1992	750
Cambodia	KR	Yes	1967	1969	71428
Chad	MDD	Yes	1991	1994	999
China	Tibet	Yes	1950	1950	5000
China	Tibet	Yes	1956	1956	4000
Congo-Brazzaville	Cobras, Ninjas	Yes	1993	1994	175
Croatia	Serbian irregulars, Serbian Republic of Krajina, Yugoslavia	Yes	1992	1993	6666
Djibouti	FRUD	Yes	1991	1994	400
Eritrea	EIJM	Yes	1997	1997	71
Eritrea	EIJM	Yes	1999	1999	236
Ethiopia, Cuba	WSLF	Yes	1975	1983	38000
Ethiopia	ONLF	Yes	1996	1996	173
Ethiopia	ONLF	Yes	1998	2002	692
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami	Yes	1996	1997	50
Ethiopia	OLF	Yes	1989	1991	300
Georgia	Republic of S. Ossetia	Yes	1992	1992	950
India	CPI	Yes	1948	1951	2400
India	PWG	Yes	1990	1994	981
India	NNC	Yes	1956	1959	342
India	NSCN (I-M)	Yes	1992	2000	912

[1] The country that is listed first is the country where the civil war was fought. Additional countries listed in this column were also involved in the civil war on the side of the government.

India	ATTF	Yes	1992	1993	63
India	NLFT	Yes	1995	1995	442
India	PLA	Yes	1982	1988	539
India	PLA	Yes	1992	1993	231
India	PLA	Yes	1995	1996	77
India	PLA	Yes	1995	1996	77
India	PLA	Yes	1995	1996	77
India	PLA	Yes	1998	1998	77
India	PLA	Yes	2000	2000	77
India	UNLF	Yes	1994	1994	71
India	UNLF, KNF	Yes	1997	1997	71
India	UNLF	Yes	1999	1999	71
India	UNLF	Yes	2003	2003	71
India	ULFA	Yes	1990	1991	239
Indonesia	Darul Islam Movement	Yes	1953	1953	1000
Indonesia	OPM	Yes	1965	1965	100
Indonesia	OPM	Yes	1967	1969	8500
Indonesia	Fretilin	Yes	1975	1989	33275
Indonesia	Fretilin	Yes	1992	1992	50
Indonesia	GAM	Yes	1990	1991	909
Iran	KDPI	Yes	1990	1990	50
Iran	KDPI	Yes	1993	1993	125
Iran	Mujahideen e Khalq	Yes	1979	1982	7400
Iran	Mujahideen e Khalq	Yes	1986	1988	1200
Iran	Mujahideen Khalq	Yes	1991	1993	405
Iran	Mujahideen Khalq	Yes	1997	1997	165
Iraq	SCIRI	Yes	1982	1984	145
Iraq	SCIRI	Yes	1987	1987	36
Iraq	KDP	Yes	1961	1970	50000
Iraq	KDP	Yes	1973	1993	40500
Laos	Pathet Lao, Neutrals	Yes	1959	1961	5000
Malaysia	CPM	Yes	1974	1975	200
Myanmar	KNU	Yes	1948	1992	1421
Myanmar	KNU	Yes	1995	1995	323
Myanmar	ABSDF	Yes	1990	1992	1310
Myanmar	Arakan Insurgents	Yes	1948	1988	1048
Myanmar	ARIF, RSO	Yes	1991	1992	26
Myanmar	NMSP	Yes	1990	1990	58
Myanmar	KNPP	Yes	1992	1992	238
Myanmar	SSA, SSIA	Yes	1960	1970	4321

Myanmar	SSNPLO, SSRA, PSLO, MTA	Yes	1976	1988	5186
Pakistan	MQM	Yes	1990	1990	25
Papua New Guinea	BRA	Yes	1989	1990	117
Philippines	MNLF	Yes	1972	1990	41028
Russia	Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeria)	Yes	1994	1996	45500
Senegal	MFDC	Yes	1990	1990	200
Senegal	MFDC	Yes	1992	1993	200
Senegal	MFDC	Yes	1995	1995	200
Senegal	MFDC	Yes	1997	2001	200
Spain	ETA	Yes	1980	1981	121
Spain	ETA	Yes	1987	1987	52
Sri Lanka	JVP	Yes	1971	1971	1630
Sri Lanka	LTTE, TELO, PLOTE	Yes	1983	2001	60000
Sudan	SPLM	Yes	1983	1996	55500
Uganda	UPA	Yes	1972	1972	200
Uganda, Libya	Military faction, UNLA , Tanzania	Yes	1978	1979	100
Uganda	NRA, UFM, UPM, UNRF, UFDM, UPF, UPDA, UPC, UNLA, FOBA	Yes	1981	1991	107700
United Kingdom	PIRA	Yes	1971	1991	3271
USA led coalition	al-Qaida (The Base)	Yes	2001	2002	5495
Algeria	Takfir wa┤ Hijra	No	1991	1991	39
Argentina	Military faction	No	1963	1963	25
Argentina	ERP , Montoneros	No	1973	1977	2984
Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia	No	1992	1994	19200
Azerbaijan	Husseinov military faction	No	1993	1993	60
Azerbaijan	OPON forces	No	1994	1994	80
Bangladesh	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	No	1974	1992	3500
Bolivia	Popular Revolutionary Movement	No	1946	1946	1009
Bolivia	MNR	No	1952	1952	600
Bolivia	ELN	No	1967	1967	82
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars, Yugoslavia	No	1992	1994	23571
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Autonomous Province of	No	1992	1995	15714

	Western Bosnia				
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Croatian irregulars	No	1993	1994	15714
Burkina Faso	Popular Front	No	1987	1987	100
Burundi	Military faction	No	1965	1965	50
Cambodia, US, S.Vietnam	FUNK, North Vietnam	No	1970	1975	156250
Cambodia	KNUFNS, Vietnam	No	1978	1978	4575
Cameroon	Military faction	No	1984	1984	500
Chad	Various groups, Libya	No	1965	1988	28000
Chad	Military faction , MOSANAT, Islamic Legion	No	1989	1990	5800
Chile	Military faction	No	1973	1973	2095
China	Peoples Liberation Army	No	1946	1949	1200000
China	Taiwanese insurgents	No	1947	1947	1000
China	Tibet	No	1959	1959	67000
Comoros	Presidential guard	No	1989	1989	27
Congo/Zaire	Katanga	No	1960	1962	683
Congo/Zaire	Independent Mining State of South Kasai	No	1960	1962	300
Congo/Zaire	CNL	No	1964	1965	29965
Congo/Zaire	Opposition militias	No	1967	1967	778
Congo/Zaire	FLNC	No	1977	1978	919
Costa Rica	National Liberation Army	No	1948	1948	2000
Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	No	1994	1994	7857
Cuba	Military faction	No	1953	1953	28
Cuba	Movimiento 26 De Julio: 26th of July Movement	No	1957	1958	5000
Cuba	National Revolutionary Council, USA	No	1961	1961	279
Dominican Republic	Military faction	No	1965	1965	3276
El Salvador	Military faction	No	1972	1972	300
El Salvador	ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC	No	1979	1979	54850
El Salvador	FMLN	No	1980	1991	150
Equatorial Guinea	Military faction	No	1979	1979	185
Ethiopia	Military faction	No	1960	1960	662
Ethiopia	EPRP, TPLF , EPDM, OLF	No	1976	1991	16000

Ethiopia	ELF , ELF factions, EPLF	No	1962	1991	200000
Ethiopia	ALF	No	1989	1991	300
Gabon, France	Military faction	No	1964	1964	30
Gambia, Senegal	SRLP	No	1981	1981	650
Georgia	Anti-government alliance	No	1991	1993	191
Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia	No	1992	1993	3000
Ghana	Military faction	No	1966	1966	27
Ghana	Military faction	No	1981	1981	50
Ghana	Military faction	No	1983	1983	26
Greece	DSE	No	1946	1949	154000
Guatemala	Military faction	No	1949	1949	40
Guatemala	Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas	No	1954	1954	48
Guatemala	MR-13 , FAR , EGP , PGT , ORPA	No	1965	1987	42250
Guatemala	URNG	No	1988	1995	4050
Guinea	Military faction	No	1970	1970	300
Haiti	Leopard Corps	No	1989	1989	30
Haiti	Tonton Macoute, Engine Lourd	No	1991	1991	250
Hyderabad	CPI	No	1947	1948	2000
India	CPI (-Marxist)	No	1967	1972	300
India	MNF	No	1966	1968	1500
India	TNV	No	1978	1988	632
India	Sikh insurgents	No	1983	1993	18875
India	ABSU	No	1989	1990	239
Indonesia	Republic of South Moluccas	No	1950	1950	5000
Indonesia	PRRI, Permesta movement, Darul Islam Movement	No	1958	1961	33444
Indonesia	OPM	No	1976	1978	8500
Iran	KDPI	No	1994	1994	125
Iran	Republic of Azerbaijan, Soviet Union	No	1946	1946	50
Iran	APCO	No	1979	1980	200
Iraq	Military faction	No	1958	1958	25
Iraq	Nationalists	No	1959	1959	2000
Iraq	Military faction	No	1963	1963	350
Kenya	Military faction	No	1982	1982	318
Laos, US, South Vietnam	Pathet Lao, North Vietnam	No	1963	1973	18500

Laos	LRM	No	1989	1990	25
Lebanon	Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun militia	No	1958	1958	1400
Lebanon	Various organizations, Syria, Israel	No	1975	1990	144000
Liberia	Military faction	No	1980	1980	27
Liberia	NPFL	No	1989	1994	23500
Madagascar	Monima National Independence Movement	No	1971	1971	128
Malaysia	CPM	No	1981	1981	25
Malaysia	CCO	No	1963	1966	400
Mali	MPA	No	1990	1990	200
Mali	FIAA	No	1994	1994	400
Mexico	EZLN	No	1994	1994	145
Moldova	Dniestr Republic	No	1992	1992	650
Morocco	Military faction	No	1971	1971	264
Morocco, Mauritania	POLISARIO	No	1975	1989	13000
Mozambique	Renamo	No	1977	1992	145400
Myanmar	BCP, leftist organisations	No	1948	1988	24883
Myanmar	ABSDF	No	1994	1994	336
Myanmar	RSO	No	1994	1994	26
Myanmar	PNDF	No	1949	1949	600
Myanmar	KIO	No	1961	1992	19213
Nepal	Nepali Congress	No	1960	1962	250
Nicaragua	FSLN	No	1978	1979	10000
Nicaragua	Contras/FDN	No	1981	1989	30000
Niger	FLAA	No	1992	1992	366
Niger	CRA	No	1994	1994	34
Nigeria	Military faction	No	1966	1966	25
Nigeria	Republic of Biafra	No	1967	1970	75000
Muscat and Oman, UK	State of Oman/Free Oman	No	1957	1957	32
Oman, Iran, Jordan, UK	PFLOAG, South Yemen	No	1972	1975	2000
Pakistan	Mukti Bahini: Liberation Force	No	1971	1971	50000
Pakistan	Baluchi separatists	No	1974	1977	8800
Panama	Military faction	No	1989	1989	200
Paraguay	Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)	No	1947	1947	4000
Paraguay	Military faction	No	1954	1954	50

Paraguay	Military faction	No	1989	1989	200
Peru	MIR, T·pac Amaru, ELN	No	1965	1966	138
Philippines	HUK	No	1946	1954	9000
Philippines	MNLF	No	1993	1993	95
Rhodesia	ZANU , ZAPU	No	1972	1979	27000
Romania	National Salvation Front	No	1989	1989	909
Russia	Parliamentary forces	No	1993	1993	193
Rwanda, Zaire	FPR	No	1990	1994	5500
Saudi Arabia	Juhayman Movement	No	1979	1979	269
Somalia	Military faction	No	1978	1978	520
South Africa	SWAPO	No	1966	1988	25000
South Africa	ANC, PAC, Azapo	No	1981	1988	4000
South Korea, USA	Leftist insurgents (e.g. Inmin-gun: Peoples Army, military faction)	No	1948	1950	31525
South Vietnam	FNL	No	1955	1964	2097705
Soviet Union	Forest Brothers	No	1946	1948	667
Soviet Union	LTS(p)A, LNJS, and LNPA	No	1946	1947	735
Soviet Union	BDPS	No	1946	1948	8620
Soviet Union	UPA	No	1946	1950	17769
Soviet Union	Republic of Armenia, ANM	No	1990	1991	800
Soviet Union	Azerbaijani Popular Front	No	1990	1990	142
Spain	ETA	No	1991	1992	72
Sudan	Anya Nya	No	1963	1972	20000
Sudan	Sudanese Communist Party	No	1971	1971	38
Sudan	Islamic Charter Front	No	1976	1976	300
Surinam	SLA/Jungle Commando	No	1986	1988	300
Syria	Military faction	No	1966	1966	300
Syria	Muslim Brotherhood	No	1979	1982	15450
Thailand	Military faction (Navy)	No	1951	1951	25
Thailand	CPT	No	1974	1982	7454
Togo	MTD	No	1986	1986	30
Trinidad and Tobago	Jamaat al-Muslimeen	No	1990	1990	30
Tunisia	RΘsistance ArmΘe Tunisienne	No	1980	1980	41
Turkey	Devrimci Sol	No	1991	1992	50
Uganda	Military faction	No	1971	1971	60
Uganda	Military faction	No	1977	1977	100

Uruguay	MLN/Tupamaros	No	1972	1972	53
Venezuela	Military faction	No	1962	1962	400
Venezuela	Military faction	No	1992	1992	183
Yemen	Democratic Republic of Yemen	No	1994	1994	5500
Yemen (North)	Opposition coalition	No	1948	1948	4000
Yemen (North), Egypt	Royalists	No	1962	1970	50000
Yemen (North)	National Democratic Front	No	1980	1982	400
Yemen (South)	Faction of Yemenite Socialist Party	No	1986	1986	11500
Yugoslavia	Republic of Slovenia	No	1991	1991	63
Yugoslavia	Republic of Croatia, Croatian irregulars	No	1991	1991	2000

Appendix C

The Involvement of Third Parties in Civil War

Foreign Involvement in Recurring Civil Conflicts

Date	Side A (Government)	Side B (Opposition)
1978-79	Libya	Tanzania
1975-95	Cuba	South Africa, Zaire
1975-83	Cuba	
1992-93		Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic of Krajina
2001	Coalition of the Willing	

Foreign Involvement in Non-Recurring Civil Conflicts

Date	Side A (Government)	Side B (Opposition)
1946		Soviet Union, Azerbaijan
1948-50	USA	
1962-70	Egypt	
1961		USA
1957	UK	
1975-90		Syria, Israel
1963-73	USA, South Vietnam	
1964	France	
1965-88		Libya
1970-75	USA, South Vietnam	North Vietnam
1978		Vietnam
1972-75	Iran, Jordan, UK	South Yemen
1975-89	Mauritania	
1981	Senegal	
1990-94	Zaire	
1992-94		Armenia, Republic of Nagorno
1992-94		Yugoslavia, Serbian Republic
1993-94		Croatia, Croatian Rep. of Bosnia & Herzegovina

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